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The Federal Response to COVID-19:
Lessons from the Pandemic
NANCY J. KNAUER†
The best-laid schemes of mice and men
Go oft awry,
And leave us nothing but grief and pain
Robert Burns (1785)
When the first suspected human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus was reported in
January 2020, the United States had in place an elaborate set of pandemic disaster and response
plans that spanned hundreds of pages. The George W. Bush administration spearheaded national
pandemic planning in 2005 as part of the post-September 11 efforts to modernize the country’s
disaster response capabilities. Subsequent administrations revisited and revised the various
pandemic plans, including the Trump administration as recently as 2017 and 2018.
Despite these detailed plans, the Trump administration was slow to respond to the emerging
public health crisis or implement any of the prescribed protocols. Federal officials lost valuable
time as they downplayed the risk posed by COVID-19 and repeatedly assured the American
people that the virus would simply “go away.” By March 2020, a frightening spike in cases in the
Northeast made the pandemic impossible to ignore. President Trump and other administration
officials shifted tactics and began to characterize COVID-19 as the quintessential “black
swan”—a threat that no one could have foreseen. President Trump repeatedly told the American
people that “no one could have predicted something like this” even though official federal policy
suggested a very different story. Far from being a black swan, the COVID-19 pandemic was
widely anticipated and, according to many epidemiologists, inevitable.
This Article argues that our botched federal response was not so much a failure of policy per se,
but rather a failure of political will. The federal government had a robust pandemic policy in
place; it simply chose not to follow it. This failure of political will illustrates the dangers that arise
when public health measures are politicized and weaponized for partisan advantage and demands
strong interventions to ensure federal accountability and transparency. The first Part of this
article outlines the evolution of our national pandemic plans within the broader context of disaster
and response planning. The second Part explains the pandemic staging framework that is used to
organize and coordinate decisionmaking within a pandemic. The third Part charts the federal
response during the crucial first three months of the public health crisis, specifically identifying
instances where the federal government failed to follow its own clearly articulated pandemic
policy. The final Part outlines some lessons learned from the pandemic and proposes reforms to
insulate public health measures from partisan wrangling and keep our federal government
faithful to its foremost obligation; namely, to promote the general welfare.

† Sheller Professor of Public Interest Law and Director of Law and Public Policy Programs, Temple
University, Beasley School of Law. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to present dynamic and ever-changing
challenges. The observations in this Article are current as of July 2021. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society Association in May 2021.
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INTRODUCTION
When the first suspected human-to-human transmission of the novel
coronavirus was reported in January 2020,1 the United States government had in
place an elaborate set of pandemic disaster and response plans that spanned
hundreds of pages.2 The George W. Bush administration spearheaded national
pandemic planning in 2005 as part of the post-September 11 efforts to modernize
the country’s disaster response capabilities.3 Subsequent administrations
revisited and revised the various pandemic plans, including the Trump
administration as recently as 2017 and 2018.4
The plans provide a multi-tiered approach to a pandemic that assumes a
coordinated response by federal, state, and local authorities, as well as private
sector involvement.5 They accurately describe many of the challenges that we
have faced during the COVID-19 pandemic, including the shortage of personal
protective equipment (PPE) for health care workers, the importance of
diagnostic testing, and the rush for a vaccine and other therapeutic treatments.6

1. COVID-19 is an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered coronavirus. See WORLD HEALTH
ORG., NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (2019-NCOV) SITUATION REPORT-1 1 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/coronaviruse/situation-reports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4 [hereinafter JAN.
21, 2020 SITUATION REPORT]. The virus and the disease were unknown until they were reported in Wuhan, China
in 2019. Id; see also Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus that Causes It, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/namingthe-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited Jan. 3, 2022). Coronaviruses are
a large family of viruses that cause illness in humans and animals. Animals and COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/animals.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2022); NAT’L CTR. FOR IMMUNIZATION & RESPIRATORY DISEASES (U.S.): DIVISION OF VIRAL
DISEASES,
CORONAVIRUS
DISEASE
2019
(COVID-19):
SITUATION
SUMMARY
(2020),
https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/87026.
2. See, e.g., HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (2005),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf [hereinafter
NATIONAL STRATEGY]. Although COVID-19 belongs to the coronavirus family of viruses, the WHO and other
national health agencies, including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommended
that pandemic influenza contingency plans and their tools should be applied to the current pandemic because
of the “clinical and epidemiological similarities between these respiratory viruses.” André Ricardo Ribas
Freitas, Marcelo Napimoga & Maria Rita Donalisio, Assessing the Severity of COVID-19, 29 EPIDEMIOL.
SERV. SAUDE, BRASÍLIA 1 (2020), http://scielo.iec.gov.br/pdf/ess/v29n2/en_2237-9622-ess-29-02e2020119.pdf.
3. IVO H. DAALDER, I. M. DESTLER, DAVID L. GUNTER, JAMES M. LINDSAY, MICHAEL E. O’HANLON,
PETER R. ORSZAG & JAMES B. STEINBERG, PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: ONE YEAR ON 1 (2003),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20030101-1.pdf (“Since the attacks of September 11,
2001, a good deal has been done to improve the safety of Americans, not only in the offensive war on terror
abroad but in protecting the homeland as well.”).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 61–71 (describing recent revisions of U.S. pandemic preparedness
and response policy).
5. See generally HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
IMPLEMENTATION (2006), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pandemic-influenzaimplementation.pdf; see also NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY 4 (2018), https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/
legal/boards/nbsb/meetings/Documents/National-Biodefense-Strategy-508.pdf.
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANS: 2017
UPDATE
44
(2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/pan-flu-report-2017v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RFE6-FGUR] [hereinafter “HHS 2017 UPDATE”].
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The US World Wide Threat Assessment for 2019 contained a stark warning that
the United States was vulnerable to “the next flu pandemic or large-scale
outbreak of a contagious disease that could lead to massive rates of death and
disability, severely affect the world economy, strain international resources, and
increase calls on the United States for support.”7 That same warning had been
included in the Threat Assessment for every year of the Trump Presidency.8
Despite these detailed plans and national security warnings, the Trump
administration was slow to respond to the emerging public health crisis or
implement any of the prescribed protocols. Federal officials lost valuable time
as they downplayed the risk posed by COVID-19 and repeatedly assured the
American people that the virus would simply “go away.”9 By March 2020, a
frightening spike in cases in the Northeast made the pandemic impossible to
ignore.10 President Trump and other administration officials shifted tactics and
began to characterize COVID-19 as the quintessential “black swan”—a threat
that no one could have foreseen.11 President Trump repeatedly told the American
people that “no one could have predicted something like this” even though
official federal policy suggested a very different story.12 Far from being a black

7. DANIEL R. COATS, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT FOR THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 21
(2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf. The Worldwide Threat
Assessment is released each year by the National Security Director. Marty Johnson, House Intelligence Briefing
on Worldwide Threat Assessment Delayed, THE HILL (Feb. 8, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/
house/482189-house-intel-briefing-on-worldwide-threat-assessment-delayed. The 2020 Assessment was
scheduled to be delivered to the House Intelligence Committee on February 12, 2020, but it was cancelled and
then never delivered. John Walcott, The Trump Administration Is Stalling an Intel Report That Warns the U.S.
Isn’t Ready for a Global Pandemic, TIME (Mar. 9, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://time.com/5799765/intelligencereport-pandemic-dangers. Reports state that the 2020 Assessment would have contained the same warning
regarding the threat of a worldwide pandemic. Id.
8. Walcott, supra note 7.
9. Daniel Wolfe & Daniel Dale, ‘It’s Going to Disappear’: A Timeline of Trump’s Claims that Covid-19
Will Vanish, CNN (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/10/politics/covid-disappearingtrump-comment-tracker/.
10. Corinne N. Thompson, Jennifer Baumgartner, Carolina Pichardo, Brian Toro, Lan Li, Robert Arciuolo,
Pui Ying Chan, Judy Chen, Gretchen Culp, Alexander Davidson, Katelynn Devinney, Alan Dorsinville,
Meredith Eddy, Michele English, Anna Maria Fireteanu, Laura Graf, Anita Geevarughese, Sharon K. Greene,
Kevin Guerra, Mary Huynh, Christina Hwang, Maryam Iqbal, Jillian Jessup, Jillian Knorr, Julia Latash, Ellen
Lee, Kristen Lee, Wenhui Li, Robert Mathes, Emily McGibbon, Natasha McIntosh, Matthew Montesano,
Miranda S. Moore, Kenya Nurray, Stephanie Ngai, Marc Paladini, Rachel Paneth-Pollak, Hilary Parton, Eric
Peterson, Renee Poucher, Jyotsna Ramachandran, Kathleen Reilly, Jennifer Sanderson Slutsker, Gretchen Van
Wye, Amanda Wahnich, Ann Winters, Marcelle Layton, Lucretia Jones, Vasudha Reddy & Anne Fine, COVID19 Outbreak—New York City, February 29–June, 1, 2020, 69 MORB. MORTAL WKLY. REP. 1725, 1727 (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6946a2-H.pdf.
11. John F. Murphy, Jerry Jones & James Conner, The COVID‐19 Pandemic: Is it a “Black Swan”? Some
Risk Management Challenges in Common with Chemical Process Safety, 39 PROCESS SAFETY PROGRESS 1–3
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://aiche.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/prs.12160 (concluding COVID-19 pandemic
does not meet the definition of a “black swan” event because it was foreseeable).
12. Ian Schwartz, Trump on Coronavirus: “Nobody Could Have Predicted Something Like This,”
REALCLEAR POLS. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/03/30/trump_on_
coronavirus_nobody_could_have_predicted_something_like_this.html.
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swan, the COVID-19 pandemic was widely anticipated and, according to many
epidemiologists, inevitable.13
In the absence of a coherent federal response, the virus was able to rage
unchecked across the country, as state and local officials attempted to stem the
tide of a global pandemic with widely disparate regional solutions.14 The spike
in cases in the Northeast turned out to be a mild harbinger of later spikes that
were driven by widespread and entrenched community spread in all fifty states.15
By March 2021, nearly 30 million Americans had been infected and over
530,000 had died from COVID-19,16 but the costs of the pandemic were not
distributed equally across society.17 Communities of color, vulnerable
populations, and front line workers experienced a disproportionate share of
cases, hospitalizations, and fatalities.18
The federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic represents a singular
example of government failure—in both the colloquial and economic sense of
the term.19 Policy makers and scholars will doubtless spend years debating what
could have caused such a massive government failure, how many lives it cost,
and what could have been done to prevent it. There is already a growing body
of literature that critiques existing public health policy through the lens of the

13. See Murphy et al., supra note 11, at 2 (noting that there were “multiple warnings from experts in
epidemiology and related public health fields that a major pandemic is not a question of if, but only of when”).
The annual Worldwide Threat Assessment also predicted that a pandemic could have devastating consequences.
See COATS, supra note 7, at 21 (describing annual threat assessments regarding pandemics).
14. See, e.g., Reuben Fischer-Baum, Daniela Santamariña & Juliet Eilperin, What Counts as an Essential
Business in 10 U.S. Cities, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/
national/coronavirus-esssential-businesses/.
15. Nic Querolo, Covid Spike in U.S. South Dwarfs Past Regional Spikes, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-05/covid-spike-in-u-s-south-dwarfs-all-earlier-regionalhot-spots. The COVID Tracking Project, The Pandemic’s Deadly Winter Surge is Rapidly Easing, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2021/02/the-pandemics-deadly-wintersurge-is-rapidly-easing/618005. During the height of the winter surge, an American was dying from COVID-19
every 33 seconds. Phillip Bump, A Death Every 33 Seconds, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/19/death-every-30-seconds.
16. Ciara Linnane, Coronavirus Tally One Year On: Global Cases Of COVID-19 Top 118 Million and U.S.
Nears 530,000 Fatalities, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 11, 2021, 6:41 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
coronavirus-tally-one-year-on-global-cases-of-covid-19-top-118-million-and-us-nears-530000-fatalities-202103-11. In the face of such staggering loss, there were few signs of collective mourning, at least at the federal
level. Ray Sanchez, Few Signs of Collective Mourning as the US Tops 170,000 Coronavirus Deaths, CNN (Aug.
16, 2020, 8:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/16/us/coronavirus-pandemic-national-mourning/index.html.
17. Tiffany N. Ford, Sarah Reber & Richard V. Reeves, Race Gaps in COVID-19 Deaths are Even Bigger
Than They Appear, BROOKINGS INST.: BLOG (June 16, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2020/06/16/race-gaps-in-covid-19-deaths-are-even-bigger-than-they-appear.
18. Aaron van Dorn, Rebecca E. Cooney & Miriam L. Sabin, COVID-19 Exacerbating Inequalities in the
US, 395 THE LANCET: WORLD REP. 1243, 1243–44 (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/
lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)30893-X/fulltext.
19. In economics, government failure refers to the idea that “a government failure should call a government
intervention into question when economic welfare is actually reduced or when resources are allocated in a
manner that significantly deviates from an appropriate efficiency benchmark.” CLIFFORD WINSTON,
GOVERNMENT FAILURE VS. MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE 3 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20061003.pdf.
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pandemic.20 This literature raises important and pressing points regarding the
need to improve our readiness and preparedness policy, invest in public health
initiatives, and reform our healthcare system.21 However, we do not know
whether the failed federal response to COVID-19 was actually a failure of policy
because the pandemic plans were not implemented.22 The failure cannot be
explained solely in terms of a missed policy nuance, lagging appropriations, or
an inequitable healthcare system. It was much more basic and, in many ways,
more troubling. As the threat of COVID-19 loomed large in the early months of
2020, the federal government chose to disregard fifteen years of pandemic
planning and stick its head in the proverbial sand. We will never know whether
the federal pandemic plans would have successfully contained or slowed the
virus because they were largely ignored.
The failed federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was first and
foremost a failure of political will. The distinction between a failure of policy
and a failure of political will is extremely important as we begin to come to grips
with the cost of our botched response to the pandemic because they raise
different questions and demand different interventions. The most comprehensive
and forward-looking public health policy is meaningless unless there is a
commitment on the part of the government to implement the policy or there is a
way to hold the government accountable for its maladministration. In the case
of COVID-19, the lapse in political will also illustrates the dangers that arise
when public health measures are politicized and weaponized for partisan
advantage.23
This article details the disconnect between the actions of the federal
government and the federal response as scripted in the pandemic plans. The first
Part of this article outlines the evolution of our national pandemic plans within
the broader context of disaster and response planning. The second Part explains
the pandemic staging that is used to organize and coordinate decision making
within a pandemic. Against that backdrop, the third Part charts the federal
response during the crucial first three months of the public health crisis,
specifically identifying instances where the federal government failed to follow
its own clearly articulated pandemic policy and missed important triggers that
should have initiated a federal response. The final Part outlines the lessons
learned from the pandemic and proposes reforms to insulate public health
measures from partisan wrangling and keep our federal government faithful to
its foremost obligation; namely, to promote the general welfare.
20. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Sick at Heart: A Fundamental Reason the United States’ Health Care
System Was Unprepared for the COVID-19 Emergency, 72 RUTGERS L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2020).
21. Id.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 165–79 detailing failure of the federal response to follow the
pandemic intervals.
23. See, e.g., Cailin O’Connor & James Owen Weatherall, Hydroxychloroquine and the Political
Polarization of Science, BOSTON REV. (May 4, 2020), https://bostonreview.net/science-nature-politics/cailinoconnor-james-owen-weatherall-hydroxychloroquine-and-political.
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I. PANDEMIC PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks prompted a searching reappraisal
of domestic security concerns, including incident preparedness and response
protocols.24 In the years immediately following the attacks, the federal
government engaged in a massive overhaul of its national preparedness and
response strategy, resulting in a comprehensive “all hazards” framework.25
Planning specific to pandemics began in earnest in 2005 during the George W.
Bush administration.26 More recently, pandemic planning has also been
included in broader protocols addressing biological threats.27 Accordingly,
national pandemic planning exists on three levels: (1) the umbrella “all hazards”
framework that specifically includes a pandemic as an example of a type of
“catastrophic incident,” (2) the more focused plans dealing with bioincidents
that include both man-made or naturally occurring incidents, such as pandemics,
and (3) the pandemic-specific planning designed to address the unique threat
posed by a novel virus. At each level of planning, it is assumed that the federal
government will play a central role in preparedness and response.
This Part provides an overview of the U.S. preparedness and response
policy that was in place in 2020 at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The
first Section explains the general framework of our national preparedness and
disaster response policy with a special emphasis on “catastrophic incidents,”
such as pandemics.28 The second Section outlines the planning regarding
biological incidents that assumes a central role for the federal government
because of the nature of the threat.29 The final Section details the pandemicspecific plans and policies, including the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act (PAHPA) of 2006.30

24. See DAALDER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1 and accompanying text.
25. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 3 (4th ed., 2019) [hereinafter
NRF], https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=830753. “All-hazards” planning is designed to provide “an
integrated approach to emergency preparedness planning that focuses on capacities and capabilities that are
critical to preparedness for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters, including internal emergencies and manmade emergencies (or both) and natural disasters.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGULATION 1 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/SurveyCertEmergPrep/Downloads/FAQ-Round-Four-Definitions.pdf.
26. Matthew Mosk, George W. Bush in 2005: ‘If We Wait for a Pandemic to Appear, It Will be Too Late
to Prepare,’ ABCNEWS (Apr. 5, 2020, 1:08 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/george-bush-2005-waitpandemic-late-prepare/story?id=69979013.
27. See NRF supra note 25, at 4. Examples of catastrophic events requiring an enhanced federal response
would include extreme and widespread natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, terrorist attacks (especially
those involving weapons of mass destruction), and pandemics. Id. at 4.
28. Catastrophic incidents assume a greater role for the federal government because they are not localized
and can easily overwhelm state and local authorities. Id.
29. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX TO THE RESPONSE AND RECOVERY
FEDERAL INTERAGENCY OPERATIONAL PLANS FINAL vii (2017), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/202007/fema_incident-annex_biological.pdf [hereinafter “BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX”].
30. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), Pub. L. No. 109–417, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-109publ417/pdf/PLAW-109publ417.pdf.
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A. THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FRAMEWORK
In 2002, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security to
coordinate and unify domestic security efforts.31 President George W. Bush
issued a series of Presidential Directives to guide the agency in its policy
development.32 Of particular interest to pandemic planning was Homeland
Security Presidential Directive #5 (HSPD-5) that instructed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to establish a comprehensive national domestic incident
management system.33 Its stated goal was to establish a single, comprehensive
approach to the domestic incident management system “to prevent, prepare for,
respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies.”34 HSPD-5 speaks of a national rather than a federal incident
management system because state and local authorities, along with non-profit
organizations such as the Red Cross, also play a vital role in disaster planning
and incident management.35
The charge of HSPD-5 was a tall order because it envisioned the integration
of all federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery plans into one “all-discipline, all-hazards plan.”36 This effort resulted
in two key policy documents: the National Incident Management System
(NIMS)37 and the National Response Plan, now known as the National Response
Framework (NRF).38 NIMS was adopted in 2004 to provide a comprehensive
national management system for responding to domestic incidents.39 NIMS
identifies the key incident management priorities: “saving lives, stabilizing the

31. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. § 101 (Nov. 25, 2002),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf. The Department of Homeland Security opened for
business on March 1, 2003. Andrew Glass, Bush Creates Homeland Security Department, Nov. 26, 2002,
POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/26/this-day-in-politicsnovember-26-1012269.
32. There are a total of twenty-five Homeland Security Presidential Directives. National Security
Presidential Directives [NSPD] George W. Bush Administration, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS,
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/index.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2022). The first one was issued shortly after the
September 11 terrorist attacks on October 29, 2001, and created the National Homeland Security Council that
was the precursor to DHS. Id. The last one was issued in 2009 and dealt with arctic region policy. Id.
33. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 of February 28, 2003 (Management of Domestic
Incidents),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%
20Directive%205.pdf [hereinafter HSPD-5]. Section 1 of HSPD-5 sets forth the goal “[t]o enhance the ability of
the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident
management system.” Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. HSPD-5 also recognizes the important role of “the private and nongovernmental sectors.” Id.
Specifically, it states that these actors have a role to “play in preventing, preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.” Id.
36. Id.
37. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 3 (3d ed., 2017),
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1508151197225-ced8c60378c3936adb92c1a3ee6f6564/FINAL_
NIMS_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NGT-8Q8N] [hereinafter NIMS].
38. See NRF, supra note 25, at.1.
39. See NIMS, supra note 37, at iii.
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incident, and protecting property and the environment.”40 NIMS takes a
functional approach to incident management and establishes core concepts,
principles, and terminology. Its aim is to help government at all levels (federal,
state, local, and tribal) work together with the private sector and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to prepare for, prevent, respond to,
recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of the incident’s
cause, size, location, or complexity.41 NIMS was revised after Hurricane Katrina
in 2008 and then again most recently in 2017.42 The NRF provides protocols for
operating under different threats or threat levels.43 It is designed to work as a
“framework for all types of threats and hazards, ranging from accidents,
technological hazards, natural disasters, and human-caused incidents.”44
Both NIMS and the NRF adopt a functional approach to all-hazard
planning in order to ensure interoperability across incidents and at all levels of
government.45 Central to this functional approach is the Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) that help organize the functional approach to all-hazards
planning.46 ESFs group governmental and some private sector capabilities into
an organizational structure that categorizes the capabilities and services most
likely to be needed when managing domestic incidents.47 The most pertinent
ESF for the response to the COVID-19 pandemic is ESF-8 Public Health and
Medical Services.48 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is
the lead federal agency for ESF-8.49
The NRF envisions that most incidents “begin and end locally.”50 State and
local authorities are expected to take the lead in domestic localized emergencies,
such as hurricanes and other mass casualty events. In such cases, the expectation
is that the federal government will play more of a supporting role with respect

40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at iii. See HSPD-5, supra note 33, at 3–4.
42. See NIMS, supra note 37, at 4.
43. See NRF, supra note 25, at 3. The NRF also advances progress under the National Security Strategy of
the United States of America. Id. The Framework helps achieve the strategy’s first pillar: to “protect the
American people, the homeland, and the American way of life.” Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7.
46. Emergency Support Functions, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/
support/esf8/Pages/default.aspx#8 (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
47. See NIMS, supra note 37, at 63.
48. ESF #8, titled Public Health and Medical Services, “[c]oordinates the mechanisms for assistance in
response to an actual or potential public health and medical disaster or incident.” NRF, supra note 25, at 40. The
categories in the support function “include but are not limited to the following: Public Health; Medical Surge
Support, including patient movement; Behavioral Health Services; Mass Fatality Management; and Veterinary,
Medical, and Public Health Services.” Id. at 40.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6. The NRF is clear that an “optimal” incident response will be primarily led by state and local
authorities “with private sector and NGO engagement throughout.” Id. at 15.
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to financial support and resources.51 The goal is for these efforts to be federally
supported, state run, and locally executed.52
However, the NRF classifies a pandemic as a “catastrophic incident” that
necessitates a larger role for the federal government.53 The NRF defines a
catastrophic incident as “one of such extreme and remarkable severity or
magnitude that the Nation’s collective capability to manage all response
requirements would be overwhelmed, thereby posing potential threats to
national security, national economic security, and/or the public health and safety
of the Nation.”54 Other examples of catastrophic incidents that would trigger an
enhanced federal response include extreme and widespread natural disasters,
such as Hurricane Katrina and terrorist attacks, especially those involving
weapons of mass destruction.55 By definition, a catastrophic incident is one that
can quickly overwhelm the capacity of state and local governments and may
require counter measures that are solely within the capacity of the United States
government, such as global threat monitoring and vaccine development.56
The NRF places ultimate responsibility squarely on the President for the
federal response to catastrophic incidents.57 Specifically, it provides that
“[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal Government
response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and
efficiently to large-scale and catastrophic incidents.”58 The NRF further
provides that a national catastrophic incident would “require the extraordinary
means of mobilizing and prioritizing national resources to alleviate human
suffering; protect lives and property; reduce damage to natural, cultural, and
historic resources; stabilize the Nation’s economy; and ensure national
security.”59 There can be no question that the COVID-19 pandemic was a
catastrophic incident within the meaning of the NRF that should have triggered
a strong federal response.

51. Id. at 6.
52. Id at 7, 15.
53. The other example provided is a cyberattack. Id. at 6 n.13; see also id. at 19 (“When an incident occurs
that exceeds or is anticipated to exceed local, state, tribal, territorial, or insular area resources or when an incident
is managed by federal departments or agencies acting under their own authorities, the Federal Government may
use the management structures described within the NRF.”).
54. Id. at 4. It defines “catastrophic incident” by refence to the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006, which provides that the term “catastrophic incident” includes “any natural disaster, act of
terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption
severely affecting the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national
morale, or government functions in an area.” 6 U.S.C. § 701(4).
55. See NRF, supra note 25, at 4.
56. Id. Although “[i]nitial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and local
authorities,” HSPD-5 provides that “[t]he Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their
resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved.” HSPD-5, supra note 33, at ¶ 6.
57. Another example provided is a cyberattack. NRF, supra note 25, at 6 n.13.
58. Id. at 34.
59. Id at 4.
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B. PLANNING FOR BIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS
The NRF includes a series of threat-specific appendices, including one that
specifically addresses biological incidents.60 The Annex on Biological Incidents
(the Annex) was most recently revised in 2017.61 It covers both naturally
occurring biological incidents, such as pandemics, and human-made threats, as
well as terrorist attacks and biological warfare.62 The Annex recognizes that a
biological incident has the potential to overwhelm state and local resources, and,
therefore, requires strong federal intervention.63 Specifically, the Annex outlines
a number of competencies that are uniquely within the power of the federal
government when preparing for and responding to a biological threat, including
threat monitoring, operational coordination, public information, medical
interventions, and modeling.64
In 2018, the Trump White House released the National Biodefense Strategy
and the National Biodefense Strategy Implementation Plan.65 Both documents
specifically address the threat posed by pandemics.66 As with the Annex, the
National Biodefense Strategy and the National Biodefense Implementation Plan
cover all biological agents whether they are naturally occurring, accidental, or
intentional.67 Goal 4 of the Implementation Plan outlines the importance of a
“rapid response to limit the impacts of bioincidents.”68 The National Biodefense
Implementation Plan clearly foregrounds the federal government as the key
actor, noting that the “federal mission is contingent upon the coordination with
and the success of the community response.”69 It also acknowledges the
importance of international partnerships because “[i]nfectious disease threats do
not respect borders.”70

60. See BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX, supra note 29, at ii.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 13. The Annex provides that “[a] biological incident refers to the occurrence of cases or outbreaks
involving an infectious agent that affects people, regardless of natural or deliberate cause, for which response
needs have the potential to overwhelm state and local resources.” Id. at vii.
63. Id. The reference to the “the potential to overwhelm state and local resources” references back to the
definition of a “catastrophic incident” under the NRF. See NRF, supra note 25, at 4.
64. See BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX, supra note 29.
65. See NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at i. An accompanying presidential memorandum
specifically provides that the National Biodefense Strategy supersedes certain prior biodefense policies
announcements, but it does not mention the national pandemic planning documents. Memorandum from the
Administration of Donald J. Trump, National Security Presidential Memorandum on Support for National
Biodefense, (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201800608/html/DCPD201800608.htm.
66. See NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at i. An accompanying Presidential memorandum
specifically provides that the National Biodefense Strategy supersedes certain prior biodefense policy
announcements, but it does not mention the national pandemic planning documents. National Security
Presidential Memorandum, supra note 65.
67. See NATIONAL BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at i.
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id. at 2.
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C. PANDEMIC-SPECIFIC PLANNING
Pandemic-specific plans were first issued from the White House in 2005.71
As the lead agency in the case of a pandemic, HHS also released its first
pandemic plan in 2005.72 Congress then passed the Pandemic and All-Hazards
Preparedness Act in 2006.73 Since these initial attempts to address the pandemic
threat, the White House, HHS, DHS, and Congress have revisited pandemicspecific response plans numerous times.74 The pandemic-specific plans and
initiatives span hundreds of pages and had been revised under every
administration since that of George W. Bush.
Table 1 provides a chronological overview of pandemic-specific planning.
TABLE 1: CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF PANDEMIC-SPECIFIC PLANNING
Date
May 2005

Policy
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (17
pages)

Institution
White House
Homeland Security Council

May 2005

HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (396 pages)

HHS

May 2006

National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan (233 pages)
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (19
pages)
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response,
and Recovery Guide for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources (54 pages)
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (16
pages)

White House
Homeland Security Council
HHS

December 2006
January 2009

Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (15
pages)

Congress
HHS

June 2017

HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (52
pages)
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and
Advancing Innovation Act

HHS

June 2006
September 2006
November 2006

June 2019

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
HHS

Congress

Table 2 organizes the pandemic-specific initiatives by their institutional
source and administration.

71. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN (2005),
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/hhspandemicinfluenzaplan.pdf [hereinafter HHS 2005 PLAN]
73. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), Pub. L. No. 109-17, 120 Stat. 2831 (2006).
74. As noted above, pandemic planning has also been explicitly covered in bioincident plans. See
BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX, supra note 29.
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TABLE 2: PANDEMIC-SPECIFIC INITIATIVES
(BY INSTITUTIONAL SOURCE AND ADMINISTRATION)
Institution
Congress

Policy
Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act
(2006)
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and
Advancing Innovation Act (2019)
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (2005)

Administration
George W. Bush

National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan (2006)
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (2005)

George W. Bush

HHS
HHS

HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (2006)
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (2009)

George W. Bush
Barrack Obama

HHS
DHS

HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan Update (2017)
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources (2006)

Donald Trump
George W. Bush

Congress
White House
Homeland Security
Council (HSC)
White House
(HSC)
HHS

Donald Trump
George W. Bush

George W. Bush

President George W. Bush took a special interest in pandemic planning
after the September 11th attacks.75 The White House released the first
comprehensive pandemic plan in May 2005, known as National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza (National Strategy).76 It was then followed a year later in
2006 by the much more comprehensive National Implementation Plan (National
Implementation Plan) that spanned 233 pages.77 The National Implementation
Plan explains that “the overarching imperative is to reduce the morbidity and
mortality caused by a pandemic.”78 To further this goal, the National
Implementation Plan sought to “leverage all instruments of national power and
ensure coordinated action by all segments of government and society, while
maintaining the rule of law, and other basic societal functions.”79
To support these pandemic planning efforts, Congress passed the Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA) of 2006, which appropriated over
$7.1 billion for pandemic planning and related activities.80 It expanded the
preparedness and response activities of HHS and created the office of the

75. See Mosk, supra note 26.
76. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2.
77. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5.
78. Id. at 6
79. Id.
80. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), Pub. L. No. 109-417 (2006). Previously,
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 gave funding to hospitals and health
systems. Pub. L. No. 107-108, 116 STAT. 594 (2020). In 2004, the Project BioShield Act authorized the federal
government to give incentives to the private sector to create drugs that could protect people from biological
weapons and naturally occurring biological threats. Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 STAT. 835 (2004).
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Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR).81 The PAHPA was
reauthorized in 2019 by the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and
Advancing Innovation Act (PAHPAIA). Both bills passed easily with bipartisan support.82
The initial HHS pandemic plans were even more detailed than those issued
by the Bush White House. This makes sense given that HHS is the lead federal
agency for all public health emergencies, including pandemics.83
All of these pandemic-specific plans remain current policy and are publicly
available on the CDC website where they have been since the start of the
pandemic.84 The level of detail provided in these pandemic-specific plans
directly disproves President Trump’s repeated assertion that “[n]o one could
have predicted something like this.”85 Read together, the plans accurately
describe the trajectory of the COVID-19 pandemic using terms and concepts that
are now all too familiar. They stress the importance of foreign containment to
buy time for preparedness measures at home and the development of medical
countermeasures, but openly acknowledge that containment will most likely not
be effective.86 When containment fails, the only option is mitigation and nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPI), such as social distancing and school
closings.87
The plans explain that daily life will be disrupted for extended periods of
time because a pandemic will present in waves that risk overwhelming our health
systems.88 Hospitals will need to extend their surge capacity and increase the
number of ICU beds and ventilators.89 There will be shortages of PPE, and new
technologies will have to be developed to both make and sanitize PPE.90 The
plans describe the rush for diagnostic tests, effective treatments, and a vaccine.
They note that these activities will require streamlined approval processes and
distribution priorities.91 They also provide sobering projections of the number of
potential deaths and hospitalizations92 and predict that there will be significant

81. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act (PAHPA), Pub. L. No. 109-417 (2006).
82. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-22
(2019).
83. HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 5.
84. Id.
85. Schwartz, supra note 12.
86. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 6 (“While complete containment might not be
successful, a series of containment efforts could slow the spread of a virus to and within the United States,
thereby providing valuable time to activate the domestic response”).
87. See HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 42
88. Id.
89. See HHS 2005 PLAN, supra note 72, at 18.
90. Id. at app. 2 (S4-7).
91. See HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 11.
92. For example, in the case of a pandemic that is classified as “very severe,“ the 2017 HHS Update
projects close to 2 million deaths and 11.5 million hospitalizations in the United States alone. See HHS 2017
UPDATE, supra note 6, at 44
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delays in processing bodies because mortuary services will be quickly
overwhelmed.93
These plans make it clear that every administration going back to that of
George W. Bush recognized the potential threat posed by a pandemic involving
a novel virus. Moreover, these plans spell out clear preparedness goals and detail
a robust pandemic response led by the federal government. In terms of readiness
goals, the 2017 HHS Update specifically mentioned two potential crises that
defined the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States—the
shortage of N95 respirators and ventilators. The 2017 HHS Update called for
“developing technology and processes that allow for rapid production of N95
respirators, to significantly increase respirator supply during an influenza
pandemic.”94 It also suggested the development of “effective reusable
respirators that will reduce the burden to produce and dispense large volumes of
disposable respirators during an outbreak.”95 The 2017 HHS Update referred to
plans to seek FDA approval for a “next-generation ventilator for all
populations,” including the development of interchangeable ventilator
components.”96
Needless to say, the readiness goals that were outlined in the 2017 HHS
Update had not been met by the beginning of 2020 when the COVID-19
pandemic reached the United States. Additionally, many commentators were
shocked when it came to light that the lauded National Stockpile did not have
adequate supplies on hand to meet the demand.97 It has been reported that the
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response did not prioritize pandemic
planning because he was more interested in biodefense.98 For example, his
office discontinued the Obama-era $35 million initiative to develop a machine
that would make 1.5 million N95 respirator masks in a day.99 The capacity to

93. Id. at 40.
94. Id. at 24.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 24.
97. Michael Biesecker & the Assoc. Press, U.S. Federal Stockpile of Medical Protective Gear is Almost
Empty as Coronavirus Spreads, FORTUNE (Apr. 9, 2020, 3:45 AM), https://fortune.com/2020/04/09/usstockpile-medical-protective-gear-almost-empty-coronavirus.
98. Jon Swaine, Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Aaron C. Davis, Before Pandemic, Trump’s Stockpile Chief Put
Focus on Biodefense. An Old Client Benefited., WASH. POST (May 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
investigations/before-pandemic-trumps-stockpile-chief-put-focus-on-biodefense-an-old-client-benefited/2020/
05/04/d3c2b010-84dd-11ea-878a-86477a724bdb_story.html. In testimony before Congress in 2011, the
Assistant Secretary seemed to dismiss the potential threat of a pandemic when he said: “Quite frankly, Mother
Nature is not a thinking enemy intent on inflicting grievous harm to our country, killing our citizens, undermining
our government or destroying our way of life. Mother Nature doesn’t develop highly virulent organisms that are
resistant to our current stockpiles of antibiotics.” Bioterrorism Threats with Officials from Depts. of DHS, HHS
& the FBI: Hearing Before the S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm., 112th Cong. (Oct. 18,
2011) (statement of Robert Kadlec, M.D., Former Homeland Security Senior Director for Biosecurity Defense),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?302149-1/us-bioterrorism-threats.
99. Swaine et al, supra note 98; see also Jon Swaine, Federal Government Spent Millions to Ramp Up
Mask Readiness, but That Isn’t Helping Now, WASH. POST, (Apr. 3, 2020, 1:27 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/federal-government-spent-millions-to-ramp-up-mask-
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make that volume of N95 respirators would have greatly relieved the N95
respirator shortage that was so severe during the early days of the pandemic and
continues to linger today.100 In another move that may have compromised
pandemic readiness, the Assistant Secretary moved the responsibility for the
National Stockpile from the CDC to his office.101
The pandemic-specific plans accurately described the trajectory of the
pandemic and recognized that it could be a multi-year event.102 For example, the
2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (National
Implementation Plan) explained: “In terms of its scope, the impact of a severe
pandemic may be more comparable to that of war or a widespread economic
crisis than a hurricane, earthquake, or act of terrorism.”103 The plans also clearly
established readiness goals that, as mentioned above, were not been met by the
time COVID-19 made its way to the United States. Most importantly, the plans
delineated a series of federal actions that should be taken at specific points
during a pandemic. For example, the National Strategy states with assurance that
“[o]nce health authorities have signaled sustained and efficient human-to-human
spread of the virus has occurred, a cascade of response mechanisms will be
initiated, from the site of the documented transmission to locations around the
globe.”104 The next Part explains the different frameworks for pandemic staging
and the various triggers for response actions.
II. PANDEMIC RISK ASSESSMENT: INTERVALS, PHASES, AND STAGES
Pandemic risk assessment is organized around the various intervals,
phases, or stages of a pandemic. The staging of a pandemic allows policy makers
and public health officials to evaluate the timing and sequence of preparedness
and response actions. The WHO established its first set of pandemic phases in
1999 and encouraged countries to develop their own more specific breakdown

readiness-but-that-isnt-helping-now/2020/04/03/d62dda5c-74fa-11ea-a9bd-9f8b593300d0_story.html
(describing Obama-era initiative).
100. Yuki Noguchi, Why N95 Masks Are Still in Short Supply in the U.S., NPR (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2021/01/27/960336778/why-n95-masks-are-still-in-short-supply-inthe-u-s.
101. Swaine et al., supra note 98.
102. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 1–2.
103. Id. at 2. The Implementation Plan provides that:
In addition to coordinating a comprehensive and timely national response, the Federal
Government will bear primary responsibility for certain critical functions, including: (1)
the support of containment efforts overseas and limitation of the arrival of a pandemic
to our shores; (2) guidance related to protective measures that should be taken; (3)
modifications to the law and regulations to facilitate the national pandemic response; (4)
modifications to monetary policy to mitigate the economic impact of a pandemic on
communities and the Nation; (5) procurement and distribution of vaccine and antiviral
medications; and (6) the acceleration of research and development of vaccines and
therapies during the outbreak.
Id. at 2.
104. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 5.
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of pandemic phases.105 The WHO pandemic phases were most recently updated
in 2013.106 The various pandemic stages are not designed to predict what will
occur during any particular pandemic nor are they necessarily linear.107 For
example, it is possible to identify a novel virus subtype in humans that does not
progress to achieve sustained human-to-human transmission and, therefore, does
not become a pandemic.
The initial 2005 HHS plan organized its preparedness and response actions
around the WHO pandemic phases.108 It provided fairly specific directions for
each pandemic phase across six different areas: planning and coordination,
surveillance and protective measures, vaccines and antiviral drugs, healthcare
and emergency response, communications and outreach, and research.109 The
next year, the United States established its first domestic set of pandemic stages
that were detailed in the National Implementation Strategy issued by the White
House.110 Once again, each pandemic stage was paired with concrete
preparedness and response actions.111 This process of pairing preparedness and
response actions with specific stages of the pandemic has continued to the
present day. The 2017 HHS Update incorporates CDC pandemic intervals that
replaced the national pandemic stages and uses them to delineate the timing of
pandemic preparedness and response actions.112
This Part explains the practical application of pandemic staging to policy
development and pandemic risk management. It is important to remember that
pandemic risk management will not stop a pandemic, but it can greatly mitigate
its impact.113 Table 3 provides a summary and comparison of the three major
frameworks for pandemic staging.

105. THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS PLAN: THE ROLE OF WHO AND
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PLANNING 7 (1999), https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/
66155 (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) [hereinafter WHO 1999 PLAN].
106. THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA RISK MANAGEMENT 14 (2017),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/259893/WHO-WHE-IHM-GIP-2017.1eng.pdf;jsessionid=FF0E44DE342CCEF9F0A31E1EFB14C8E8?sequence=1 [hereinafter WHO 2017 PLAN].
107. Rachel Holloway, Sonja A. Rasmussen & Stephanie Zaza, Updated Preparedness and Response
Framework for Influenza Pandemics, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 5, 8 (2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr6306.pdf.
108. HHS 2005 PLAN, supra note 72, at 33.
109. Id. at 33–34.
110. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 32.
111. Id.
112. HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 47. First reported in 2005, the pandemic intervals were updated in
2012 to reflect the lessons of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Id. at 7–8.
113. “Management of risk does not imply an ability to prevent a pandemic, but rather to make best use of
available resources to reduce the extent of disease, reduce the impact of secondary catastrophes, and to prevent
panic from occurring in the population.” WHO 1999 PLAN, supra note 105, at 31.
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TABLE 3: THREE MAJOR FRAMEWORKS FOR PANDEMIC STAGING
WHO Pandemic Phases
(2013)

National Implementation
Plan (2006)

CDC Pandemic Intervals
(2017)

Interpandemic phase: Period
between pandemics
1. No new virus subtype in
humans but may be present in
animals.
2. Circulating new virus
subtype in animals poses risk
to humans.
Alert phase: New virus
subtype identified in humans
3. Human infection with new
virus subtype, but no humanto-human transmission.
4. Small cluster(s) with limited
human-to-human
transmission.
5. Larger cluster(s), but still
localized.

Stage 0: Animal outbreak
overseas
Stage 1: Suspected human-tohuman outbreak overseas
Stage 2: Confirmed humanto-human outbreak overseas

Investigation: A new type of
virus is identified and
investigated—in animals or
humans anywhere in the
world—that is thought to have
implications for human health.

Pandemic phase: Global
spread of human influenza
caused by a new subtype
6. Increased and sustained
transmission in the general
population.

Stage 3: Widespread humanto-human outbreaks in
multiple locations overseas

Recognition: Increased cases, or
clusters of cases, are identified
anywhere in the world, along
with an increased potential for
person-to-person transmission.

Stage 4: First human case in
North America

Initiation: Cases of the virus are
confirmed anywhere in the world
with both efficient and sustained
person-to-person transmission.

Stage 5: Spread throughout
the United States

Acceleration: Consistently
increasing rate of pandemic
influenza cases identified in the
United States, indicating
established transmission.

Stage 6: Recovery and
Preparation for Subsequent
Waves

Deceleration: Consistently
decreasing rate of cases in the
United States.

Transition phase: Reduction
in global risk, reduction in
response activities, recovery.

Preparation: Preparation for
future pandemic waves with
continued outbreaks possible in
some jurisdictions.
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A. THE WHO PANDEMIC PHASES
The WHO first issued its breakdown of pandemic phases over twenty years
ago in 1999 with the publication of its Influenza Pandemic Plan (WHO Plan)
that described the role of the WHO and provided guidelines for both national
and regional planning efforts.114 Recognizing the diverse history of worldwide
pandemics in the twentieth century,115 the WHO Plan was designed to provide a
flexible framework to assist its member states in addressing planning for a
pandemic.116 It delineated six separate phases of a pandemic and provided
detailed guidance regarding what actions the WHO should take at the various
phases.117 All but one phase focused on the pandemic.118 Only Phase 0 dealt with
pre-pandemic preparedness activities, although Phase 0 was divided into three
levels of preparedness: Level 1 – new virus subtype in a human; Level 2 –
confirmed human infection; and Level 3 – confirmed human-to-human
transmission.119 The WHO Plan urged countries to establish National Pandemic
Planning Committees or similar appointed bodies to develop nation-specific
pandemic plans guided by the WHO framework.120
The WHO revised its pandemic phases in 2013 by introducing a continuum
of four pandemic phases.121 Under the revised framework, only one phase takes
place during the pandemic.122 The two prior phases occur prior to a pandemic
outbreak and one occurs after a pandemic or post-pandemic peak.123 The phases
are Inter-pandemic (preparedness and planning), Alert (emergency and preemptive response), Pandemic (minimizing impact), and Transition.124
The WHO pandemic phases are designed to “describe and communicate
worldwide disease progression”125 and provide a general view of the “emerging
epidemiologic situation.”126 They are independent of whether the WHO declares
114. WHO 1999 PLAN, supra note 105, at 1.
115. A later WHO document explains:
There were three major pandemics in the 20th century, commonly referred to as the
“Spanish flu” in 1918–1919, the “Asian flu” in 1957–1958, and the “Hong Kong flu” in
1968–1969. The most serious of these was the pandemic caused by the A(H1N1) virus
in 1918–1919, which resulted in 20–50 million deaths, and had a particularly notable
impact on mortality in young adults. The A(H2N2) pandemic in 1957–1958 and the
A(H3N2) pandemic in 1968–1969 each caused around 1 million deaths worldwide.
WHO 2017 PLAN, supra note 106, at 26.
116. Id. at 8.
117. WHO 1999 PLAN, supra note 105, at 8–16.
118. Id. at 10–12.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 21.
121. THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA RISK MANAGEMENT INTERIM GUIDANCE 6 (2013),
https://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/pandemic/GIP_PandemicInfluenzaRiskManagementInterimGuida
nce_Jun2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Holloway et al., supra note 107, at 3.
126. Id.
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a PHEIC or a pandemic.127 WHO encourages countries to de-couple their
pandemic planning from the pandemic phases and create their own countryspecific plans.128 Figure 1 shows the current WHO pandemic phase continuum
and reflects a global average of cases.129
FIGURE 1: WHO PANDEMIC PHASE CONTINUUM130

B. NATIONAL PANDEMIC STAGES
As explained earlier, the first pandemic plan in the United States was issued
by the White House in 2005. It was a broad policy document organized around
three “pillars”: Preparedness and Communication; Surveillance and Detection;
and Response and Containment.131 The following year, the National
Implementation Plan provided greater specificity regarding the role of the
federal government in pandemic preparedness and response. The National
Implementation Plan recognized the crucial role of preparedness, but also
stressed that it was “important to show how this preparedness will translate to
action in the period of time immediately before, during, and after the emergence
of a pandemic.”132 In order to spell out the necessary steps at each phase of a
pandemic, the National Implementation Plan adopts a seven-stage pandemic
framework and identifies the required federal action for each stage.133 This
framework diverged considerably from the pandemic phases that the WHO was
using at the time because its first four stages occur before the first human case
appears in North America.134
Under the National Implementation Plan, the seven pandemic stages
are:

127.
128.
129.
130.

WHO 2017 PLAN, supra note 106, at 14.
Id. at 13.
Id.
THE WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDANCE FOR SURVEILLANCE DURING AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 2017
UPDATE 13 (2017), https://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/pandemic/WHO_Guidance_for_surveillance_
during_an_influenza_pandemic_082017.pdf.
131. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 7.
132. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 30.
133. Id. at 31–32.
134. Id. at 32.
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Stage 0: New Domestic Animal Outbreak in At-Risk Country
Stage 1: Suspected Human Outbreak Overseas
Stage 2: Confirmed Human Outbreak Overseas
Stage 3: Widespread Human Outbreaks in Multiple Locations Overseas
Stage 4: First Human Case in North America
Stage 5: Spread throughout United States
Stage 6: Recovery and Preparation for Subsequent Waves135

For each stage, the National Implementation Plan outlines specific (1)
objectives; (2) immediate actions; (3) policy decisions; and (4) communications
and outreach.136
To put this staging into perspective, the first case of COVID-19 in North
America was reported in real time on January 21, 2020, in Washington state,
although we now know that the novel coronavirus was circulating in the United
States prior to that date.137 The National Implementation plan notes that “the
development of the first case anywhere in North America represents a significant
threat to the entire continent, as for practical purposes it will be impossible to
prevent completely the migration of disease across land borders.”138
Accordingly, the first human case in the United States should have triggered
numerous actions by the federal government. The goals of the actions were
three-fold: (1) contain the early cases to slow the first wave of the pandemic; (2)
assess and develop medical countermeasures; and (3) implement the national
response.139 The immediate actions to be taken included (1) deploying
stockpiled materials to the region; (2) limiting non-essential travel in the area;
(3) instituting protective measures and social distancing; (4) supporting delivery
of essential goods; (5) continuing work on the development of a pandemic
vaccine, which should have started in Stage 2; (6) activating pandemic plans at
all levels of government; (7) activating surge plans in the federal health system
and requesting that state and local authorities do the same; (8) continuing the
development and deployment of diagnostic reagents to all laboratories “with
capability and expertise in pandemic influenza diagnostic testing”; and (9)
developing antivirals.140 All of these actions and more should have occurred
under the direction of HHS, sometimes working in conjunction with DHS.141

135. Id.
136. Id. The pandemic stages “provided greater specificity for U.S. preparedness and response efforts than
the WHO phases and facilitated initial planning efforts by identifying objectives, actions, policy decisions, and
message considerations for each stage.” Holloway et al., supra note 107, at 2.
137. The first COVID-19-related death in the U.S. was thought to be on February 26th, but subsequent
testing has revealed that COVID-19 was spreading in the community much earlier, with the first death now
documented on February 6th, 2020. Thomas Fuller, Mike Baker, Shawn Hubler & Sheri Fink, A Coronavirus
Death in Early February Was ‘Probably the Tip of an Iceberg,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/santa-clara-county-coronavirus-death.html.
138. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 39.
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The National Implementation Plan also includes clear guidelines on how
to manage communications with state, local, and tribal authorities, institutions,
the public, and global partners.142 With respect to communications with the
general public, the National Implementation Plan suggests a review of action to
reduce the likelihood of infection, along with a recommendation to curtail nonessential travel and prepare for implementation of community disease
containment measures as the virus spreads.143 On January 22, 2020, a day after
the first reported case in the United States, President Trump told CNBC in an
interview from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland: “We have it
totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China. It’s going to be just
fine.”144
C. PANDEMIC INTERVALS FRAMEWORK (PIF)
Our current pandemic preparedness and response policy is organized
around the six pandemic intervals: Investigation, Recognition, Initiation,
Acceleration, Deceleration, and Preparation. The pandemic intervals replaced
the pandemic stages that were established by the National Implementation Plan
in 2006.145 The PIF was designed as a common framework to guide preparedness
and response actions at the federal, state, and local level. Unlike the pandemic
stages, the PIF does not assume that the pandemic originates outside the United
States, thereby increasing its flexibility.146 The PIF is also designed to cover
moderate, as well as severe, pandemics147 and recognizes that the progression of
the pandemic will differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.148

142. HHS 2005 PLAN, supra note 72, at 9 (“During a pandemic, HHS will provide honest, accurate and
timely information on the pandemic to the public. It will also monitor and evaluate its interventions and will
communicate lessons learned to healthcare providers and public health agencies on the effectiveness of clinical
and public health responses.”); HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 40–41.
143. HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 40–41.
144. Mathew J. Belvedere, Trump Says He Trusts China’s Xi on Coronavirus and the US Has It ‘Totally
Under Control,’ CNBC (Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trump-on-coronavirus-from-chinawe-have-it-totally-under-control.html.
145. HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 46.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Id. at 3. HHS 2017 UPDATE explains:
The 2005 Pandemic Influenza Plan and subsequent updates focused on planning for a
severe pandemic with effects that would extend beyond health consequences to include
social and economic disruption. By preparing exclusively for a very severe pandemic,
the Plan did not include specific guidance for the type of pandemic we experienced in
2009, which was comparatively less severe. Id.
148. Id. at 42.
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FIGURE 2: PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FRAMEWORK FOR NOVEL
INFLUENZA A VIRUS PANDEMICS (CDC INTERVALS)149

The PIF describes the progression of a pandemic along six intervals—two
pre-pandemic and four during the pandemic.150 As with the WHO pandemic
phases, progression through the pandemic intervals is not necessarily linear and
different parts of the country may be experiencing different intervals.151 The PIF
is designed to be used in conjunction with the Pandemic Risk Assessment
Framework (PRAF) that helps evaluate the severity of a pandemic.152 The PRAF
measures viral transmissibility and clinical severity to estimate the potential
impact of the virus.153 The projected severity of a pandemic can help further
inform decision making regarding preparedness and response actions.154 Figure
3 scores the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic.155 You can see that the
COVID-19 pandemic ranks up there with the devastating Spanish Influenza
pandemic of 1918 that resulted in an estimated 500,000 deaths in the United
States at the time when the total population was only about 105 million.156

149. Holloway et al., supra note 107, at 4.
150. Id. at 46–47.
151. Id. at 47.
152. “The IRAT [Influenza Risk Assessment Tool] assesses the potential human pandemic risk of novel
influenza A viruses to inform decisions regarding the development, manufacturing, use, and stockpiling of
diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics.” Id. at 12.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 51.
155. Freitas et al., supra note 2.
156. HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 42.
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FIGURE 3: SEVERITY OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC157

The 2017 HHS Update directly engages the PIF across seven domains: (1)
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Laboratory Activities; (2) Community
Mitigation Measures; (3) Medical Countermeasures; (4) Health Care System
Preparedness and Response; (5) Communications and Public Outreach; (6)
Scientific Infrastructure and Preparedness; and (7) Domestic and International
Response Policy.158 It provides detailed actions and recommendations for each
pandemic interval across all seven domains.159 For example, during the Initiation
interval, HHS is directed to evaluate non-medical countermeasures, such as
closures and social distancing.160 It is also directed to “maintain situationappropriate border and travelers’ health measures.”161
III. MAPPING THE FEDERAL RESPONSE: THE TIMELINE
COVID-19 is a novel coronavirus for which humans have no natural
immunity.162 When it first appeared in humans, there were no effective medical
countermeasures (e.g., vaccine or treatment).163 With a susceptible population
157. Freitas et al., supra note 2.
158. Id. at 5–6. “It serves as an Update of the 2005 HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan and its interim updates
issued in June 2006, November 2006, and January 2009, and sets the course for the next decade.” Id. at 8.
159. Id. at 13. The HHS 2017 Update provides: “Taken together, the updated domains reflect an end-to-end
systems approach to improving the way preparedness and response are integrated across sectors and disciplines,
while remaining flexible for the conditions surrounding a specific pandemic.” Id.
160. Holloway et al., supra note 107, at 10, 15.
161. Id.
162. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 1.
163. Id.
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and global travel, the virus moved quickly from the first outbreaks in Wuhan,
China in late December 2019 and early January 2020 to being declared a
worldwide pandemic on March 11, 2020.164 From the outset, it was clear that
the pandemic was not going to be a discrete “incident” within the meaning of
the federal preparedness and response plans. It was not a hurricane or terrorist
attack. The waters would not recede nor would the perpetrators be identified and
brought to justice. Instead, the COVID-19 pandemic promised to be a multi-year
disaster that would unfold in waves with ever-increasing spikes in cases,
hospitalizations, and deaths.
The pandemic plans discussed in Part I recognized that, because of
globalization, “a human outbreak anywhere means risk everywhere.”165
Specifically, the 2017 HHS Plan provides that “[s]ustained human-to-human
transmission anywhere in the world will be the triggering event to initiate a
pandemic response by the United States.”166 Accordingly, the first three
intervals described under the PIF (Investigation, Recognition, and Initiation)
refer to events that could be taking place outside the United States.167 In a little
under two months from the time that the CDC became aware of the first human
cases in China, the United States had initiated a pandemic wave and cases were
accelerating exponentially. In this compressed timeline, the actions taken during
the pre-pandemic intervals are crucial to containing or at least slowing the
pandemic. Table 4 illustrates how quickly the United States progressed through
the first intervals.

164. WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-directorgeneral-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020.
165. HHS 2005 Plan, supra note 72, at 20. The HHS 2017 Update replaced the earlier seven-stage pandemic
model in the National Strategy with the Pandemic Intervals Framework. HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 46.
It identifies six stages of a pandemic: two are pre-pandemic and represent a time of preparedness and readiness,
two are during a pandemic wave, and one is the period of recovery where preparedness for the next wave begins.
Id. at 46–47.
166. HHS 2005 Plan, supra note 72, at 20. The National Strategy referred to a “cascade” of federal action.
NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 8.
167. HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 46.
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TABLE 4: TIMELINE OF UNITED STATES PROGRESSION
THROUGH THE FIRST INTERVALS
Pandemic Intervals
Investigation: risk assessment and
monitoring.

COVID-19 Pandemic Timeline
December 31, 2019 – CDC aware of
human cases in China.168

Recognition: case-based control, treatment
and isolation of ill persons, and voluntary
quarantine of contacts.

January 3, 2020 – CDC Director
informed that a mysterious respiratory
illness was spreading in Wuhan China.169

Initiation: routine personal protective
measures (e.g., hand hygiene, social
distancing, remote working (where
possible)) is essential, as is enhanced
surveillance for detecting additional cases
(testing ability and analytical capacity).

January 14, 2020 – WHO warns of
possible human-to-human
transmission.170
January 20, 2020 – Chinese authorities
confirm human-to-human transmission.171

Acceleration: mitigation nonpharmaceutical interventions in the
community (e.g., school and child-care
facility closures, social distancing), as well
as the use of medications and vaccines if
available.

January 20, 2020 – first confirmed case
in the United States.172
January 30, 2020 – first case of humanto-human transmission confirmed in the
United States.173
February 26, 2020 – community
transmission in the United States.174

This Part describes the events of the first three months of 2020 and the
accompanying messaging failures. It compares and contrasts the measures taken
by the federal government to the actions prescribed in the pandemic plans. In
some cases, it also discusses actions taken by state and local governments. It is

168. John S. Mackenzie & David W. Smith, COVID-19: A Novel Zoonotic Disease Caused by a
Coronavirus from China: What We Know and What We Don’t, MICROBIOLOGY AUSTL. (Mar. 17, 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7086482.
169. China Pneumonia Outbreak: Mystery Virus Probed in Wuhan, BBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50984025.
170. Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 29, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline.
171. Lily Kuo, China Confirms Human-To-Human Transmission of Coronavirus, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/20/coronavirus-spreads-to-beijing-as-china-confirmsnew-cases.
172. Michelle L. Holshue, First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United States, 382 NEW ENG. J. OF
MED. 929, 929 (2020).
173. CDC Confirms Person-to-Person Spread of New Coronavirus in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0130-coronavirusspread.html.
174. CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Michelle A. Jorden, Sarah L. Rudman, Elsa Villarino, Stacey
Hoferka, Megan T. Patel, Kelley Bemis, Cristal R. Simmons, Megan Jespersen, Jenna Iberg Johnson, Elizabeth
Mytty, Katherine D. Arends, Justin J. Henderson, Robert W. Mathes, Charlene X. Weng, Jeffrey Duchin,
Jennifer Lenahan, Natasha Close, Trevor Bedford, Michael Boeckh, Helen Y. Chu, Janet A. Englund, Michael
Famulare, Deborah A. Nickerson, Mark J. Rieder, Jay Shendure & Lea M. Starita, Evidence for Limited Early
Spread of COVID-19 Within the United States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 680, 683 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6922e1-H.pdf.
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not meant to be a comprehensive overview of those frantic first months, but
rather is designed to show the disconnect between policy and actions. For
example, CDC guidance clearly states that NPIs should be introduced early
during the Initiation and Acceleration period and that the scope of the NPIs
should reflect the severity of the pandemic.175 In the case of the COVID-19
pandemic, the CDC did not release social distancing guidelines until mid-March,
despite the fact there was confirmed community transmission in midFebruary.176 As mentioned in a prior Part, the United States had not met its
pandemic preparedness goals when the first confirmed cases of the novel
coronavirus were reported in the United States in January 2020,177 and this lack
of preparedness certainly compromised the ability of the federal government to
launch a robust pandemic response.178 This Part focuses primarily on the federal
pandemic response rather than its preparedness failures.
A. JANUARY 2020
The month of January started in the Investigation interval, but by the time
it came to a close the United States was firmly in the Initiation interval and, with
the first confirmed human-to-human transmission reported on January 30th, it
was inevitably careening toward the Acceleration interval.179 Accordingly,
January should have been a month of extreme activity. The 2017 HHS Update
promised that the first confirmed human-to-human transmission would trigger a
cascade of federal actions, but the hesitancy of the administration to
acknowledge the unfolding crisis squandered valuable time with respect to

175. Noreen Qualls, Alexandra Levitt, Neha Kanade, Narue Wright-Jegede, Stephanie Dopson, Matthew
Biggerstaff, Carrie Reed & Amra Uzicanin, Community Mitigation Guidelines to Prevent Pandemic Influenza
— United States, 2017, 66 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 9 (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/rr/pdfs/rr6601.pdf (noting each interval is associated with particular
response activities, including implementation of select NPIs during the initiation and acceleration).
176. Dawn Kopecki, CDC Recommends Canceling Events with 50 or More People for the Next Eight Weeks
Throughout US, CNBC (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/16/cdc-recommends-the-cancellationof-events-with-50-or-more-people-for-the-next-eight-weeks-throughout-us.html.
177. See COATS, supra note 7 (describing annual threat assessments).
178. The National Stockpile was not able to meet the demand for the life-saving PPE and ventilators that
became so crucial as the pandemic accelerated because, inter alia, it had prioritized bioterrorism to the detriment
of planning for naturally occurring bioincidents. Chris Hamby & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, How One Firm Put an
‘Extraordinary Burden’ on the U.S.’s Troubled Stockpile, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/03/06/us/emergent-biosolutions-anthrax-coronavirus.html. Various pandemic preparedness initiatives had
been discontinued by the Trump administration, which had also disbanded the White House National Security
Council Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense and transferred the control of the National
Stockpile from the CDC to a political appointee within HHS, the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response. Id. Swaine et al, supra note 98 (describing transfer of Stockpile). Accordingly, although additional
funding for the National Stockpile is important, Congress must consider ways to ensure that pandemic
preparedness goals are prioritized and insulated from political considerations.
179. See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, supra note 174, at 682 (noting first confirmed case of humanto-human transmission); see also text accompanying supra notes 145–59 (explaining pandemic intervals).
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testing, containment efforts, stockpile supplies, community mitigation measures,
and messaging.180
The CDC started working on the coronavirus outbreak as soon as it was
informed of the outbreak in Wuhan. Throughout January, the CDC and HHS
took many of the incident management steps spelled out in the pandemic plans.
CDC Director Robert Redfield notified the Secretary of HHS, Alex Azar, on
January 3, 2020, and Secretary Azar passed the information on to the National
Security Council.181 Reports indicate that the developing situation was included
in President Trump’s daily briefings by early January.182 On January 3rd, the
CDC offered technical assistance to China and three days later it issued a travel
advisory for the city of Wuhan.183 That week, HHS convened an intra-agency
task force and the CDC established a coronavirus incident task force.184 The
CDC issued its first public alert on January 8, 2020.185
On January 17th, the CDC dispatched public health experts to screen
incoming passengers at the three main airports receiving passengers from
China.186 The next day, Secretary Azar briefed President Trump, who reportedly
called Azar an alarmist.187 On January 20th, China confirmed human-to-human
transmission of the new virus and the United States saw its first confirmed case.
On that same day, the CDC developed its test for COVID-19, but the test would
prove to be defective and that failure would greatly compromise surveillance
180. See Holloway et al., supra note 107, at 27–29. Cameron Peters, A Detailed Timeline of All the Ways
Trump Failed to Respond to the Coronavirus, VOX (June 8, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/8/21242003/
trump-failed-coronavirus-response.
181. Michael D. Shear, Sheri Fink & Noah Weiland, Inside Trump Administration, Debate Raged Over
What to Tell Public, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/us/politics/trumpcoronavirus.html.
182. Id.
183. Glenn Kessler, Did Trump Offer Experts to China to Help with the Coronavirus?, WASH. POST (Apr.
3, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/04/03/how-much-pressure-did-trump-put-chinaaccess-concerning-coronavirus.
184. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) SITUATION
SUMMARY (Mar. 14, 2020), https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85891 (CDC established a COVID-19 Incident
Management System on January 7, 2020); SETH ABRAMSON, PROOF OF CORRUPTION: BRIBERY, IMPEACHMENT,
AND PANDEMIC IN THE AGE OF TRUMP 464 (2021) (HHS began convening intra-agency task force by January 7,
2020).
185. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, OUTBREAK OF PNEUMONIA OF UNKNOWN ETIOLOGY
(PUE) IN WUHAN, CHINA (Jan. 8, 2020, 4:15 PM), https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/HAN00424.asp.
186. Laura Santhanam, CDC Confirms 2nd U.S. Case of Novel Coronavirus in Chicago, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/cdc-confirms-second-u-s-case-of-novel-coronavirus-inchicago. The airport screening efforts were initially limited to the three U.S. airports receiving the highest
volume of passengers arriving from Wuhan, China: Los Angeles International Airport, California; San Francisco
International Airport, California; and John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City, New York. Phillip
Dollard, Isabel Griffin, Andre Berro, Risk Assessment and Management of COVID-19 Among Travelers Arriving
at Designated U.S. Airports, January 17–September 13, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1681,
1681 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6945a4-H.pdf. The CDC later determined
that screening efforts at airports were ineffective. Id.
187. Rebecca Ballhaus & Stephanie Armour, Health Chief’s Early Missteps Set Back Coronavirus
Response, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/health-chiefs-early-missteps-set-backcoronavirus-response-11587570514.
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and containment efforts.188 The CDC also started working with state and local
governments to identify and monitor all persons who had close contact with
confirmed patients.189 On January 23rd, the CDC opened its emergency
operations center.190 It was the same day that China announced a lockdown of
Wuhan, which is a city of 11 million people.191 The lockdown would last for
seventy-six days.192
On January 29th, the White House announced the creation of the White
House Coronavirus Task Force that originally had a limited scope focusing on
travel restrictions and getting U.S. citizens out of Wuhan.193 President Trump’s
Trade Adviser, Peter Navarro, prepared a Memorandum for the President that
outlined the potential risks posed by the coronavirus and presciently projected
as many as a half a million deaths.194 It said: “The lack of immune protection or
an existing cure or vaccine would leave Americans defenseless in the case of a
full-blown coronavirus outbreak on U.S. soil . . . . This lack of protection
elevates the risk of the coronavirus evolving into a full-blown pandemic,
imperiling the lives of millions of Americans.”195 That same day, Secretary Azar
warned the President that there was a risk of a pandemic196 and the WHO
declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.197 The WHO’s
statement accompanying the declaration urged the institution of community
mitigation measures or NPIs: “The Committee believes that it is still possible to
interrupt virus spread, provided that countries put in place strong measures to
detect disease early, isolate and treat cases, trace contacts, and promote social

188. Michael D. Shear, Abby Goodnough, Sheila Kaplan, Sheri Fink, Katie Thomas & Noah Weiland, The
Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html.
189. Rachel M. Burke, Claire M. Midgley, Alissa Dratch, Marty Fenstersheib, Thomas Haupt, Michelle
Holshue, Isaac Ghinai, M. Claire Jarashow, Jennifer Lo, Tristan D. McPherson, Sara Rudman, Sarah Scott, Aron
J. Hall, Alicia M. Fry & Melissa A. Rolfes, Active Monitoring of Persons Exposed to Patients with Confirmed
COVID-19 — United States, January–February 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 245, 245–46
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6909e1-H.pdf.
190. See Shear et al., supra note 188.
191. Andreas Illmer, Yitsing Wang & Tessa Wong, Wuhan Lockdown: A Year of China’s Fight Against the
Covid Pandemic, BBC NEWSHOUR (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55628488.
192. Talha Burki, Journey to Wuhan During Its Lockdown, 21 THE LANCET 613 (2021),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(21)00166-3/fulltext.
193. For example, on February 5, 2020, the United States evacuated 350 U.S. citizens from Hubei province.
Miriam Jordan & Julie Bosman, Hundreds of Americans Were Evacuated from the Coronavirus Epicenter. Now
Comes the Wait., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/coronavirus-flightswuhan.html.
194. Eric Lipton, David E. Sanger, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear, Mark Mazzetti & Julian E. Barnes,
He Could Have Seen What Was Coming: Behind Trump’s Failure on the Virus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-response.html.
195. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 164.
196. Lipton et al., supra note 194.
197. Merrit Kennedy, WHO Declares Coronavirus Outbreak a Global Health Emergency, NPR (Jan. 30,
2020, 2:59 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/01/30/798894428/who-declares-coronavirusoutbreak-a-global-health-emergency.

78

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:1

distancing measures commensurate with the risk.”198 Despite this warning, the
federal government and individual states did not direct their populations to
practice social distancing until March 15th.199 On the last day of the month, HHS
declared a public health emergency200 and issued new travel restrictions, but by
the time the restrictions took effect 300,000 persons had already traveled from
China to the United States.201 Over the course of January, the CDC had
responded to clinical inquiries from state and local health officials regarding
approximately 650 persons thought to be at risk for infection.202 That number
would grow exponentially in the months to come.
B. FEBRUARY 2020
February opened with new cases being reported throughout the county. By
mid-February there was sustained human-to-human spread in multiple cities in
the United States, which signals a switch to the Acceleration interval.203 During
the Acceleration interval, mitigation strategies or NPIs replace containment
efforts in an attempt to flatten the pandemic curve.204 The federal response,
however, continued to focus exclusively on ineffective containment measures,
such as travel restrictions and airport screenings, until the end of March.205
Attempts to monitor and track the progression of the virus were severely
hampered by compromised diagnostic testing and insufficient surveillance
resources.206

198. Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency
Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-healthregulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov.
199. Kopecki, supra note 176.
200. Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azardeclares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html.
201. Yasmeen Abutaleb, Josh Dawsey, Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, The U.S. was Beset by Denial and
Dysfunction as the Coronavirus Raged, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2020/04/04/coronavirus-government-dysfunction/?arc404=true.
202. Kristina L. Bajema, Alexandra M. Oster, Olivia L. McGovern, Stephen Lindstrom, Mark S. Stenger,
Tara C. Anderson, Cheryl Isenhour, Kevin R. Clarke, Mary E. Evans, Victoria T. Chu, Holly M. Biggs, Hannah
L. Kirking, Susan I. Gerber, Aron J. Hall, Alicia M. Fry & Sara E. Oliver, Persons Evaluated for 2019 Novel
Coronavirus — United States, January 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 166, (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6906e1.htm.
203. See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, supra note 174, at 680.
204. Qualls et al., supra note 175, at 8–9.
205. Shear et al., supra note 188.
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FIGURE 4: GOALS OF COMMUNITY MITIGATION207

The United States continued to lose valuable time when it could have been
preparing for the rapid spike in cases that occurred in March and April.208 The
National Stockpile was woefully undersupplied with the type of PPE and
ventilators that would be in great demand during a pandemic wave, but purchase
orders for additional material would not be processed until the following
month.209 Instead of urging social distancing and other community mitigation
measures, as suggested by the WHO, President Trump amped up his misleading
and false messaging that Americans had nothing to fear from the coronavirus
and that it would just “go away.”210 He frequently contradicted members of his
own administration and sometimes even contradicted himself. In interviews with
the journalist Bob Woodward, that were not made public until September 2020,
President Trump admitted that he knew the coronavirus was airborne and
“deadly” in February, but he explained that, “I wanted to always play it down. I

207. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INTERIM PRE-PANDEMIC PLANNING GUIDANCE:
COMMUNITY STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES – EARLY, TARGETED,
LAYERED USE OF NONPHARMACEUTICAL INTERVENTIONS 18 (2007), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemicresources/pdf/community_mitigation-sm.pdf.
208. As former HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius stated: “We basically wasted two months.” Michael
Biesecker, US ‘Wasted’ Months Before Preparing for Coronavirus Pandemic, AP NEWS (Apr. 5, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/090600c299a8cf07f5b44d92534856bc.
209. Id.
210. On February 28, in a particularly memorable press conference, the President stated that, “It’s going to
disappear. One day, it’s like a miracle, it will disappear.” Katelyn Burns, Trump’s 7 Worst Statements on the
Coronavirus Outbreak, VOX (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/3/13/21176535/
trumps-worst-statements-coronavirus.

80

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:1

still like playing it down, because I don’t want to create a panic.”211 Toward the
end of the month, President Trump restructured the incident management of the
pandemic response by sidelining HHS Secretary Azar and installing Vice
President Pence as the head of the White House Coronavirus Task Force,
presumably to better control the messaging.212 These areas of deficiency—
testing, supply shortages, misguided containment efforts, reluctance to institute
community mitigation measures, and constant misleading and false
messaging—would continue to plague the Trump administration’s response to
the pandemic until his last days in office.213
In many ways, the containment efforts were doomed from the beginning
given the unavailability of a fast and reliable diagnostic test. In the absence of
widespread testing, the United States was effectively flying blind because it had
no idea how widespread the virus was within communities.214 Initially, the CDC
required all tests to be sent back to CDC headquarters in Atlanta, creating what
members of Congress referred to in a letter to the head of the CDC as an
“unsustainable bottleneck.”215 After receiving emergency use authorization
from the FDA, the CDC sent diagnostic tests to state-run labs, but the tests
proved defective.216 Although other researchers developed a more reliable test,
it did not receive FDA approval until mid-March.217 The testing bottleneck
intensified because tests were only being made available to people who were
symptomatic and hospitalized, had relevant travel history, or confirmed
exposure.218 The CDC fixed its faulty test for COVID-19 by February 27th, but
tests remained difficult to get because of the restrictive criteria.219 Despite the
obvious problems regarding testing, President Trump repeatedly denied that
211. Trump Deliberately Played Down the Virus, Woodward Book Says, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54094559.
212. Lipton et al., supra note 194.
213. One ray of sunlight was that HHS was able to cement a number of vaccine partnerships with private
firms during this period. See, e.g., HHS, Janssen Join Forces on Coronavirus Vaccine, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/02/11/hhs-janssen-join-forces-oncoronavirus-vaccine.html.
214. Carolyn Y. Johnson & Laurie McGinley, What Went Wrong with the Coronavirus Tests in the U.S.,
WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/what-went-wrong-with-the-coronavirustests/2020/03/07/915f5dea-5d82-11ea-b29b-9db42f7803a7_story.html.
215. Letter from Members of the U.S. Congress to Dr. Redfield, Dir. Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention (Feb. 3, 2021), https://kilmer.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter%20to%20CDC%20Director%
20Redfield%202.3.2020.pdf.
216. Johnson & McGinley, supra note 214.
217. Id.; News Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Issues First
Emergency Use Authorization for Point of Care Diagnostic (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-issues-first-emergency-use-authorization-pointcare-diagnostic.
218. Jessica Wang, Lindsay Huth & Taylor Umlauf, How the CDC’s Restrictive Testing Guidelines Hid the
Coronavirus Epidemic, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2020), https://archive.vn/20200322161141/https://www.wsj.com/
articles/how-the-cdcs-restrictive-testing-guidelines-hid-the-coronavirus-epidemic-11584882001.
219. Id. (describing restrictive criteria); Rob Stein, CDC Has Fixed Issue Delaying Coronavirus Testing In
U.S., Health Officials Say, NPR (Feb. 27, 2020, 10:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/
2020/02/27/809936132/cdc-fixes-issue-delaying-coronavirus-testing-in-u-s (describing defective CDC test).
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there was any difficulty, stating at the end of February that “we’re testing
everybody that we need to test. And we’re finding very little problem. Very little
problem.”220
HHS Secretary Azar addressed the critical shortages in the National
Stockpile beginning in late January and early February. On February 5th, he
made a formal request to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for $2
billion of additional funding to purchase essential medical supplies for the
National Stockpile.221 The Washington Post reported that the request led to a
shouting match between the Secretary and an OMB official.222 Five days later,
Secretary Azar took his case to Congress and testified before the Senate,
reporting that the National Stockpile only had 30 million surgical masks and 12
million N95 respirators.223 He estimated that an additional 300 million of each
would be needed to protect health care workers.224 Over a month later, Congress
appropriated $8 billion to replenish the stockpile, but HHS did not place an order
for N95 respirators until March 12th.225 The delay meant that, by then, the
United States was competing with other countries, and many crucial supplies
ended up being backordered.226 President Trump faced increasing calls from
Governors to invoke the Defense Production Act in order to shore up the supply
of life-saving PPE and ventilators, but he refused to exercise his authority to
compel production until the end of March.227 Instead of focusing on the National
Stockpile, President Trump created a supply chain task force known as Air
Bridge that was headed by his son-in-law and advisor, Jared Kushner.228
Manned by twenty-something volunteers, the task force has been widely derided

220. President Trump with Coronavirus Task Force Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.cspan.org/video/?469747-1/president-trump-announces-vice-president-pence-charge-coronavirus-response.
221. Amy Goldstein, Lena H. Sun & Beth Reinhard, Desperate for Medical Equipment, States Encounter a
Beleaguered National Stockpile, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/desperate-for-medical-equipment-states-encounter-a-beleaguered-national-stockpile/2020/03/
28/1f4f9a0a-6f82-11ea-aa80-c2470c6b2034_story.html.
222. Abutaleb et al., supra note 201.
223. Nsikan Akpan, U.S. Has Only a Fraction of the Medical Supplies it Needs to Combat Coronavirus,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/us-america-hasfraction-medical-supplies-it-needs-to-combat-coronavirus.
224. Id.
225. Biesecker, supra note 208.
226. Id. Nagal Toosi, ‘Lord of the Flies: PPE Edition’: U.S. Cast as Culprit in Global Scrum Over
Coronavirus Supplies, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/03/ppe-worldsupplies-coronavirus-163955.
227. Maegan Vazquez, Kaitlan Collins, Sara Sidner & Jason Hoffman, Trump Invokes Defense Production
Act to Require GM to Make Ventilators, CNN (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/27/politics/
general-motors-ventilators-defense-production-act/index.html; Andrew Jacobs, Despite Claims, Trump Rarely
Uses Wartime Law in Battle Against Covid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/22/
health/Covid-Trump-Defense-Production-Act.html.
228. Kathryn Watson, What is Project Airbridge?, CBS NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/coronavirus-what-is-project-airbridge.
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as both chaotic and ineffective.229 Its efforts also competed with other federal
and state purchasing efforts.230
By February 14th, the CDC was working with local public health
department networks of community-based influenza surveillance to aid in the
detection of COVID-19, but the unavailability of a fast and reliable diagnostic
test greatly hampered containment efforts, as did the lack of resources for
surveillance operations.231 In fact, the continued focus on containment efforts
and travel restrictions seemed misplaced in light of confirmed human-to-human
transmission in multiple cities.232 Early in the public health crisis, the Chief
Medical Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, Dr. Duane C. Caneva,
organized a series of coronavirus e-mail chains among a group of infectious
disease experts both in and out of government.233 The New York Times reported
that on February 17th, a participant observed that the conditions on a cruise ship
were similar to the type of social gatherings that took place every day at malls,
schools, and workplaces.234 That same day, another participant noted it would
be difficult for state and local officials to impose NPIs, such as school and
business closures, without federal leadership given the potential political
fallout.235 By the following week, the group had “effectively concluded that the
United States had already lost the fight to contain the virus, and that it needed to
switch to mitigation” efforts such as NPIs.236 For the group, the tipping point
was the “realization that many people in the country were likely infected and
capable of spreading the disease, but not showing any symptoms.”237
Bolstering this conclusion was the fact that the CDC confirmed widespread
community transmission on February 20th. At a briefing on February 25th,
Director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory
Diseases, Dr. Nancy Messonnier, stated that the coronavirus outbreak met two
of the three required factors for a pandemic: illness resulting in death and

229. Nicholas Confessore, Andrew Jacobs, Jodi Kantor, Zolan Kanno-Youngs & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, How
Kushner’s Volunteer Force Led a Fumbling Hunt for Medical Supplies, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/05/us/jared-kushner-fema-coronavirus.html.
230. Diana Falzone, “Like a Bully at the Lunchroom”: How the Federal Government Took Control of the
PPE Pipeline, VANITY FAIR (May 6, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/05/how-the-federalgovernment-took-control-of-the-ppe-pipeline.
231. Johnson & McGinley, supra note 214.
232. We now know that there was community spread at least in the San Francisco Bay area by late January.
See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, supra note 174, at 682.
233. Eric Lipton, The ‘Red Dawn’ Emails: 8 Key Exchanges on the Faltering Response to the Coronavirus,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-red-dawn-emailstrump.html.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. This is referred to as asymptomatic or cryptic infection. In other words, by the time the United States
announced the European travel ban on March 11, the group considered such containment steps ineffective. Id.
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sustained person-to-person spread.238 The only missing factor, she explained,
was the worldwide spread that the WHO had still not verified despite mounting
cases across the globe.239 Dr. Messonnier warned that “disruption to everyday
life might be severe.”240 It was reported President Trump was “furious” and
threatened to fire Dr. Messonnier.241
The very next day, the CDC reported the first case of confirmed community
transmission in the United States, but we now know that community
transmission had begun as of late January.242 That was the same day that
President Trump appointed Vice President Pence to lead the Coronavirus Task
Force.243 After the installation of Vice President Pence, President Trump
became a more frequent contributor to the briefings and, by March, monopolized
them.244 The briefings became an arena for President Trump to downplay the
severity of the crisis, attack his critics, and spread false and misleading
information.245 Eventually, some news outlets stopped carrying the briefings in
order to not amplify false information.246
On February 28th, the first death from COVID-19 in the United States was
reported in real time in the Seattle area.247 We now know that the earliest
confirmed death from COVID-19 was February 6th in the San Francisco Bay

238. John Bacon & Kevin Alltucker, Could a Coronavirus Pandemic be Stopped? US Warns of ‘Severe’
Disruptions, USATODAY (Feb. 25, 2020, 10:38 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/02/
25/coronavirus-pandemic-can-outbreak-still-be-stopped/4865934002.
239. Why Is the WHO Not Calling the Coronavirus A Pandemic? NPR: MORNING EDITION (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/02/25/809182758/why-is-the-who-not-calling-the-coronavirus-a-pandemic.
240. Ryan Goodman & Danielle Schulkin, How Trump and His Team Covered Up the Coronavirus in Five
Days, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/opinion/coronavirus-trumpcoverup.html.
241. J. Edward Moreno, Trump Threatened to Fire CDC’s Chief of Respiratory Diseases in February:
Report, THE HILL (Apr. 22, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/494187-trump-threatened-tofire-cdcs-chief-of-respiratory-diseases-in.
242. See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, supra note 174, at 682.
243. Michael D. Shear, Noah Weiland & Katie Rogers, Trump Names Mike Pence to Lead Coronavirus
Response, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/us/politics/trump-coronaviruscdc.html.
244. Dareh Gregorian, Trump Skips Questions at Coronavirus Briefing After Disinfectant Debacle, NBC
NEWS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-skips-questions-coronavirusbriefing-after-disinfectant-debacle-n1192341; see also Jonathan Martin & Maggie Haberman, Trump Keeps
Talking. Some Republicans Don’t Like What They’re Hearing. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/09/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-pressbriefing.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article.
245. Libby Cathey, 9 Controversial Moments That Led Trump to Stop His White House Coronavirus
Briefings, ABC NEWS (July 21, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/controversial-moments-led-trump-stopwhite-house-coronavirus/story?id=71899110.
246. Eric Wemple, More News Outlets Are Bailing on Trump’s Coronavirus Briefings, WASH. POST (Apr.
16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/16/more-news-outlets-are-bailing-trumpscoronavirus-briefings.
247. Nicole Acevedo & Minyvonne Burke, Washington State Man Becomes First U.S. Death from
Coronavirus, NBC NEWS (Feb. 29, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/1st-coronavirus-death-u-sofficials-say-n1145931.
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area.248 On the last day of the month, the CDC began investigating an outbreak
at an assisted living facility in Washington state, and the governor declared a
state of emergency.249 It was the first outbreak at a nursing home or similar
facility—venues that would be hard hit by COVID-19 and become emblematic
of the isolation experienced by many during the early months of the
pandemic.250 Eventually, all fifty states would declare a state of emergency due
to COVID-19,251 and every state in the union would be declared a federal
disaster area.252
C. MARCH 2020
March 2020 was the month that America shut down—schools, universities,
workplaces, houses of worship, major sports leagues, and all non-essential
businesses.253 It became increasingly clear that attempts at containing the virus
had failed, as the United States earned the status as the country with the largest
number of confirmed COVID-19 cases—a title that it would maintain
throughout the pandemic.254 With no approved medical countermeasures and a
vaccine still far on the horizon, the only tools left were the type of mitigation
measures and NPIs that the WHO had asked nations to consider at the end of
January.255 To quote Dr. Messonnier, the “disruption of daily life” would prove
to be “severe.”256
With a sudden cascade of closures and declarations, the shut-down of
America seemed to happen swiftly, but the crisis had been months in the making.
The United States had watched other nations, including China and Italy, impose
harsh geographic quarantines, once communities had been seeded with the virus,

248. See CDC COVID-19 Response Team, supra note 174, at 680.
249. Acevedo & Burke, supra note 247.
250. Farah Stockman, Matt Richtel, Danielle Ivory & Mitch Smith, ‘They’re Death Pits’: Virus Claims at
Least 7,000 Lives in U.S. Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/17/us/coronavirus-nursing-homes.html.
251. Samuel Wonacott, All 50 States Have Active Declared Emergencies Related to the Coronavirus
Pandemic, BALLOTPEDIA NEWS (July 29, 2020), https://news.ballotpedia.org/2020/07/29/all-50-states-haveactive-declared-emergencies-related-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic.
252. Justine Coleman, All 50 States Under Disaster Declaration for First Time in US History, THE HILL
(Apr. 12, 2020) (reporting that, within a twenty-two day period, President “Trump declared a major emergency
in all 50 states and most territories”).
253. Major sports leagues announced the suspension of their seasons that were already in progress, and
Major League Baseball announced the cancellation of all remaining spring training games and delayed the start
of the 2020 season. The NCAA canceled all postseason tournaments in their winter and spring sports, which
included the men’s and women’s basketball tournaments, as well as the baseball and softball tournaments. How
the Coronavirus is Affecting Sports Leagues and Events, LA TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2020-03-09/coronavirus-latest-news-sports-world.
254. Donald G. McNeil Jr., The U.S. Now Leads the World in Confirmed Coronavirus Cases, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/26/health/usa-coronavirus-cases.html.
255. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 170.
256. Brianna Abbott & Stephanie Armour, CDC Warns It Expects Coronavirus to Spread in U.S., WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cdc-warns-it-expects-coronavirus-to-spread-in-u-s11582653829.
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in an attempt to slow the progression of the pandemic.257 The NPIs that were
rolled out in March had been prescribed in the pandemic plans. They had been
developed by the CDC in 2007 and tested by mathematical models, including
reports from the earliest days of the health crisis in Wuhan.258 However, there
was one important difference: these rapidly cascading actions were being driven
by state and local officials and the private actors.259 The federal government
remained largely focused on containment and continued to issue travel
restrictions.260
In the first days of March, large tech firms, such as Microsoft, urged their
employees to work from home beginning on March 3rd.261 They were quickly
joined by universities and colleges, as state and local officials started to issue
stay-at-home orders.262 The WHO finally declared a pandemic on March 11th,
although some U.S. news outlets had already started calling it a pandemic.263
Two days later, President Trump issued the Proclamation on Declaring a
National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19)
Outbreak and declared a national state of emergency.264

257. Illmer et al., supra note 191.
258. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 207, at 7.
259. Dan Balz, As Washington Stumbled, Governors Stepped to the Forefront, WASH. POST (May 3, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/power-to-states-and-governors-during-coronavirus/.
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6, 2020), https://it.usembassy.gov/lifting-of-global-level-4-global-health-advisory.
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the Pack, How Microsoft Told Workers to Stay Home, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/15/technology/microsoft-coronavirus-response.html. The Seattle School District was the first major
school district to announce a prolonged closure. Lauren Camera, Seattle Public Schools Close Due to
Coronavirus, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2020-0311/seattle-public-schools-close-due-to-coronavirus-first-major-system-to-announce-prolonged-closure.
Colleges and universities started sending their students home. Karen Weintraub & Susan Svrluga, Harvard Tells
Students to Move Out and Finish Classes Remotely after Spring Break in Response to Covid-19, WASH. POST
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/03/10/harvard-moves-classes-onlineadvises-students-stay-home-after-spring-break-response-covid-19.
262. Governors have the right to exercise their inherent police powers reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X. These reserved powers include the police power, which is the ability to
regulate behavior and enforce order to further health, safety, and general welfare. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (defining “police powers” as “the authority to provide for the public health, safety,
and morals”). According to most authorities, these powers include issuing stay-at-home orders, restrictions on
gatherings, and closing private businesses. Thomas Johnson & Angela Fritz, You’re Under a Stay-at-Home
Order? Here’s What That Means in Your State, WASH. POST (May 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
health/2020/04/06/coronavirus-stay-at-home-by-state. Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu & Vanessa Swales, See Which
States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020) (316 million people in 42
states, two counties, ten cities, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico).
263. Sanjay Gupta, Why CNN is Calling the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak a Pandemic, CNN (Mar. 11,
2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/09/health/coronavirus-pandemic-gupta/index.html.
264. Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
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After the CDC released its first social distancing guidance, President
Trump increased the volume of his false and misleading communications
regarding the pandemic: contradicting members of his own administration,265
ignoring science,266 touting unproven medical countermeasures,267 and openly
sparring with governors.268 He started to appear at the daily White House
Coronavirus Task Force press briefings where his unscripted remarks sometimes
went on for an hour or more.269 As mentioned earlier, some news outlets stopped
airing the daily briefings because they did not want to spread the misinformation
and false claims made by the President and members of his administration.270
Testing problems persisted throughout March. It was reported that fewer
than 14,000 tests had been done in the first ten weeks since the United States
learned about the virus.271 By the week of March 25th, the United States was
performing around 110,000 tests a day, but experts estimated that number should
be between 500,000 and “millions” of tests a day.272 There were various barriers
to ramping up testing capacity, including labs that said they did not have enough
swabs, test kits, reagents, PPE, staff, or machines to run the specific required
tests.273 On the brighter side, the Trump Administration secured public-private
partnerships to open up drive-through testing collection sites and emergency
approval for rapid coronavirus tests.274
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271. Shear et al., supra note 188 (“hospitals and clinics across the country still must deny tests to those with
milder symptoms, trying to save them for the most serious cases, and they often must wait a week for results”).
272. Dylan Scott, America’s Embarrassingly Mediocre Coronavirus Testing, in 2 Charts, VOX (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/15/21222375/coronavirus-covid-19-test-update-end-social-distancing.
273. Id.
274. Id.; Amy Goldstein, Laurie McGinley & Yasmeen Abutaleb, Trump Says He Will Partner with Private
Sector to Expand Coronavirus Testing but Details are Sketchy, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/under-heavy-fire-trump-administration-takes-steps-to-expandcoronavirus-testing/2020/03/13/f86b481e-6525-11ea-acca-80c22bbee96f_story.html.
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As the scramble for PPE and ventilators intensified,275 the Justice
Department created a price gouging and hoarding task force to investigate and
prosecute scams and other crimes related to the pandemic.276 U.S. auto
manufacturers were enlisted to make ventilators, with production starting the
following month. 277 Five U.S. Army hospital units were deployed to New York
and Washington State.278 The Army Corps of Engineers and the National Guard
built field hospitals in multiple cities, and the USNS Comfort sailed to New York
City to assist local hospitals.279 The following month would see federal mortuary
services dispatched to numerous states as the rate of death overwhelmed local
funeral homes.280
IV. LESSONS FROM THE PANDEMIC
National pandemic preparedness and response policy assumes a crossinstitutional coordinated effort that is focused on a common goal, namely the
containment, mitigation, and eventual end of a pandemic outbreak. Under all
existing policies, a pandemic is a “catastrophic incident” within the meaning of
our national preparedness and response policy that requires both swift federal
action and leadership.281 Accordingly, the federal government should play a
pivotal role in this coordinated effort because a pandemic is not restricted to a
particular geographical location, requires expertise and resources that are
uniquely within the purview of the federal government, and has the potential to
overwhelm the capacities of state and local authorities.282 The enhanced role
that the federal government is supposed to play in a pandemic recognizes both
the nature of the threat and the magnitude of countermeasures that must be
deployed.283 In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trump administration
failed to fulfill its most basic obligation to the American people to provide for

275. Clary Estes, States Are Being Forced into Bidding Wars to Get Medical Equipment to Combat
Coronavirus, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/claryestes/2020/03/28/states-have-arebeing-forced-into-bidding-wars-to-get-medical-equipment-to-combat-coronavirus/?sh=3d95e55a1cde.
276. Justice Department Launches Probes into Hoarding as Coronavirus Cases Grow, REUTERS (Mar. 23,
2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-hoarding/justice-department-launchesprobes-into-hoarding-as-coronavirus-cases-grow-idUSKBN21A3TV.
277. Jay Ramey, GM, Ventec Go from Drawing Board to Ventilator Production in Under a Month,
AUTOWEEK (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.autoweek.com/news/industry-news/a32169651/gm-starts-ventilatorproduction-in-under-a-month.
278. Ellen Mitchell, Pentagon to Deploy Field Hospitals to New York, Seattle, THE HILL (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/defense/489079-pentagon-to-deploy-field-hospitals-to-new-york-seattle.
279. Michael Schwirtz, The 1,000-Bed Comfort Was Supposed to Aid New York. It Has 20 Patients., N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/nyregion/ny-coronavirus-usns-comfort.html.
280. Cristian Radulescu & Chris Lancia, Crisis Response, Mortuary Affairs, Troops Provide Support to
Civil Authorities During COVID-19, ARMY SUSTAINMENT (July 22, 2020), https://www.army.mil/article/
237332/crisis_response_mortuary_affairs_troops_provide_support_to_civil_authorities_during_covid_19.
281. See NRF, supra note 25 at 4 (defining “catastrophic incident”).
282. Id. (the three factors that define a catastrophic incident).
283. Id.
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the common defense and promote the general welfare; both in terms of its
pandemic preparedness and its pandemic response.
This massive government failure presents a challenge when attempting to
evaluate the effectiveness of our pandemic policy because the federal
government did not follow its own guidelines. Instead of hewing close to the
pandemic plans and existing CDC guidance, the Trump administration
popularized two key falsehoods about the COVID-19 pandemic. First, President
Trump and members of his administration repeatedly told the American people
that no one saw the pandemic coming.284 Those claims are belied by the
extensive pandemic planning that had been in place since 2005; plans that have
been revisited by every president since George W. Bush.285 They are also belied
by the clear-eyed warnings contained in the annual threat assessments prepared
by the National Security Director.286 The pandemic might have been an
unwelcome development, but it was certainly not a surprise. Second, President
Trump and members of his administration consistently downplayed the severity
of the situation and misrepresented the appropriate role of the federal
government in a pandemic.287 The first lie gave the administration cover for not
being prepared for the pandemic threat, but the second lie directly impeded the
pandemic response by delaying necessary actions, undermining mitigation
efforts, and sowing doubt across a vast swath of the American population. The
virus skepticism encouraged by the Trump administration then morphed into
vaccine hesitancy.288 Despite abundant supplies of highly effective vaccines, a
large portion of the U.S. population continued to refuse to get vaccinated even
in the face of new, highly contagious, and virulent variant strains of COVID19.289
This Part explores what can be done to avoid a similar government failure
going forward and recommends: (1) revisiting our pandemic policy; (2)
enhancing government transparency and accountability; and (3) resisting the use
of science as a partisan cudgel. It will most likely take years of commissions and
investigations to understand fully what motivated federal officials to ignore
well-established federal policy and place so many American lives and
livelihoods in peril. As our public health experts begin to rewrite our pandemic
policy, it is important to acknowledge that at the heart of the failed federal
response to the COVID-19 pandemic was lack of political will, which cannot be

284. Schwartz, supra note 12.
285. Mosk, supra note 26.
286. See COATS, supra note 7, at 21 (explaining threat assessments).
287. Wolfe & Dale, supra note 9.
288. Caitlin Owens, When Vaccine Hesitancy Becomes Political, AXIOS (Apr. 19, 2021),
https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-vaccine-hesitancy-politics-trump-biden-31b9eebb-8a6f-4b44-82d5425dd966d5ef.html.
289. Erica Grieder, Collision of Delta Variant, Widespread Vaccine Hesitancy Doesn’t Bode Well for Texas,
HOUS. CHRON. (June 26, 2021), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/grieder/article/Collisionof-Delta-variant-widespread-vaccine-16275344.php.
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remedied solely by a smarter, clearer, or better funded pandemic policy. The
failed federal response was not simply the natural consequence of insufficient
appropriations, underdeveloped models, or conflicting policy priorities. It was
something much more fundamental and perhaps more difficult to address—our
government failed to act. Accordingly, while public health experts re-evaluate
our pandemic policy and funding levels, it will be up to legal experts to develop
structural reforms and mechanisms to ensure that federal officials do not
abdicate their responsibility to the American people. Until then, even the most
enlightened and well-funded public health policy initiatives will not make the
United States any safer the next time we are confronted with a novel virus.
A. REVISIONS TO PANDEMIC POLICY
National pandemic planning is constantly revised to incorporate insights
gained from the last pandemic.290 The COVID-19 pandemic will no doubt
provide public health experts with a wealth of data to consider as they revisit
pandemic preparedness and response policy. In addition to these new scientific
insights, it is also possible to rework our pandemic policy in ways that would
enhance transparency and accountability by reducing the discretion of
government actors in favor of science-driven recommendations. Although this
article focuses primarily on the failed federal response to COVID-19, it is now
clear that the United States also failed to meet its pandemic preparedness goals.
The failure to meet these goals was arguably due to the same types of issues that
hamstrung the federal pandemic response: conflicting or mixed priorities,
political pressure, and perhaps self-interest. Accordingly, this Section outlines
ways that U.S. pandemic policy could be revised to hold future administrations
accountable with respect to both pandemic preparedness and response goals.
1. Pandemic Preparedness
Throughout his time in office during the pandemic, President Trump
asserted that no one could have foreseen the COVID-19 pandemic.291 This
patently false claim seemed tailor made to explain why the United States was so
woefully unprepared to meet the challenges presented by the novel coronavirus.
Take for example, the Strategic National Stockpile, which is the crown jewel of
U.S. pandemic preparedness policy.292 As explained in greater detail in Part III
above, it turned out that the much lauded Strategic National Stockpile was
severely under resourced and unable to meet the needs of desperate governors

290. See Lipton et al., supra note 194.
291. Aaron Blake, Trump Keeps Saying ‘Nobody’ Could Have Foreseen Coronavirus. We Keep Finding
Out About New Warning Signs, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/03/19/trump-keeps-saying-nobody-could-have-foreseen-coronavirus-we-keep-finding-out-about-newwarning-signs.
292. CONG. RSCH. SERV., NATIONAL STOCKPILES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11574 (describing Strategic National Stockpile).
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and mayors during those harrowing early months of the pandemic.293 The lack
of available resources was compounded by the very narrow view that the Trump
administration took regarding the role that the federal government and the
National Stockpile should play in state and local pandemic response efforts.294
Although hearings and investigations are necessary to determine exactly
how and why the Trump administration failed to meet the pandemic
preparedness goals, there are a number of widely reported instances where the
Trump administration abandoned Obama-era pandemic preparedness
initiatives.295 For example, the Trump administration discontinued an initiative
to rapidly manufacture N95 respirators—something that would have been quite
useful during the PPE crisis in the beginning of the pandemic.296 It also
disbanded the White House National Security Council Directorate for Global
Health Security and Biodefense297 and transferred the control of the Strategic
National Stockpile from the CDC to a political appointee within HHS, who
reportedly prioritized bioterrorism over naturally occurring biological
disasters.298
Securing sufficient funding from Congress for the Strategic National
Stockpile has been a longstanding challenge for administrations.299 However,
additional funding alone will not ensure that the country is any more prepared
for the next pandemic because HHS holds the discretion to set priorities.300
Congress should consider ways to hardwire pandemic preparedness goals
through appropriations in order to ensure that preparedness goals are prioritized
and insulated from partisan or self-interested considerations.301 For example, it
has been reported that the political appointee in charge of the National Stockpile,
the Assistant Secretary for Response and Preparedness, purchased vast amounts

293. Andrew Hay, ‘On Our Own Now’: U.S. Strategic Stockpile Empty of Medical Supplies, REUTERS (Mar.
31, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-stockpile/on-our-own-now-u-s-strategicstockpile-empty-of-medical-supplies-idUSKBN21I3FE.
294. Quint Forgey, ‘We’re Not a Shipping Clerk’: Trump Tells Governors to Step up Efforts to Get Medical
Supplies, POLITICO (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/19/trump-governors-coronavirusmedical-supplies-137658.
295. It bears mentioning that President Trump frequently claimed that the poor state of the National
Stockpile was President Obama’s fault. He made this claim, despite the fact that when the pandemic hit,
President Trump was already three-quarters the way through his term in office. Jane C. Timm, Fact Check:
Trump Falsely Claims Obama Left Him ‘Nothing’ in the National Stockpile, NBCNEWS (May 6, 2020),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/fact-check-trump-falsely-claims-obama-left-him-nothingnational-n1201406.
296. Swaine et al., supra note 98.
297. Glen Kessler & Meg Kelly, Was the White House Office for Global Pandemics Eliminated?, WASH.
POST (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/20/was-white-house-office-globalpandemics-eliminated.
298. Swaine et al., supra note 98.
299. See, e.g., Richard Hall, Obama Administration Asked for Funding to Tackle Future Pandemics but
Republicans Refused, INDEP. UK (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
obama-ebola-coronavirus-trump-congress-tea-party-a9469186.html.
300. See Blake, supra note 291.
301. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 292 (explaining that some stockpiles are legislatively mandated).
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of smallpox vaccine, which reflected his focus on bioterrorism.302 Without
guidance and direction from Congress, it is easy to see how additional funding
could just translate into additional doses of smallpox vaccine, if left to the
individual discretion of a political appointee. As discussed below in Subpart B,
it would also be possible for Congress to revest authority over the Strategic
National Stockpile with the CDC, thereby reducing the likelihood that the
Strategic National Stockpile could become politicized.
2. Pandemic Response
With respect to the pandemic response plans, individual government actors
are also entrusted with considerable discretion, which allowed the federal
response to falter significantly during those key early months of the COVID-19
pandemic. It is also possible that the singularity of the COVID-19 pandemic was
obscured, at least initially, by the all-inclusive and all-hazards approach adopted
by U.S. preparedness and response policy. Arguably, broad policy documents
designed to cover all circumstances could have left government officials without
sufficiently clear direction to guide their decision making. These issues related
to framing and discretion can be addressed within existing pandemic
preparedness and response policy.
The extreme urgency of a “severe” or “very severe” pandemic, to use the
ranking provided by the PRAF, could have been somewhat muted by the policy
decision to produce plans that addressed a wide range of scenarios. For example,
the first generation of pandemic plans released by the White House and HHS in
2005 and 2006 assumed a severe pandemic that was along the magnitude of the
1918 Spanish Flu pandemic.303 The CDC later released very detailed guidance
in 2007 regarding the implementation of NPIs in the case of a severe
pandemic.304 That guidance drew heavily from limited historical observations
from the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic with respect to the efficacy of social
distancing measures when used on a large scale.305
However, there was a shift of emphasis in the pandemic plans after the
2009 H1N1 pandemic, which was relatively mild compared to COVID-19.306
The 2009 H1N1 pandemic highlighted the need to produce guidelines tailored
for a less severe, but still quite serious, pandemic.307 In 2017, both HHS and the
CDC revised their pandemic guidance to cover a broad spectrum of pandemic
scenarios, ranging from “mild” to “very severe” on the PRAF.308 The adoption
of these broader and intentionally more flexible plans, along with the
introduction of the Pandemic Intervals, arguably diluted some of the specificity
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Swaine et al., supra note 98.
HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 3.
Id.
Id.
See id.; Lipton et al., supra note 194.
HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 3–4, 11.
Id. at 4, 11, 52.
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of the first-generation plans that often contained very clear triggers for federal
response actions.309 Going forward, it may be worthwhile to differentiate more
clearly between plans for “severe” or “very severe” pandemics and those for
more “mild” pandemics, such as the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
The same can be said of our reliance on an “all-hazards” and “incident”
management rubric that could potentially blunt the uniqueness of a “severe” or
“very severe” pandemic.310 Moreover, pandemic-specific plans are almost
exclusively focused on pandemic influenza.311 Although public health
authorities early on determined that these pandemic influenza plans were
applicable to the novel coronavirus, there are some differences that presumably
should be taken into account in future policy planning and guidance.312 For
example, in the case of pandemic influenza, the development of an effective
vaccine may take a shorter period of time because manufacturers can build on
the existing vaccine methods that are used to produce the seasonal flu
vaccines.313 With the novel coronavirus, scientists had a very limited knowledge
base.314 Vaccines to protect against coronaviruses had been developed for
domestic animals and livestock.315 There had also been preliminary research
regarding vaccines to protect against severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)
and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), both of which are caused by
coronaviruses that are closely related to the COVID-19 virus, SARS-CoV-2.316
Other than that, vaccine manufacturers were pretty much starting from
scratch.317 The delay in the development of an effective vaccine for the
coronavirus that would then be widely available meant that NPIs would have to
be in place for an extended period of time, including school closures and social
distancing.
Finally, there is the question of how to strike the balance between the
benefits of flexibility in application and the certainty of bright-line triggers that
mandate particular response actions.318 The current pandemic plans are designed
to be flexible and adaptable to many different pandemic scenarios. They also
stress that decision making should take into account a variety of considerations.
Accordingly, much of the government action prescribed under our pandemic
plans is discretionary. This includes the various emergency declarations that

309. Id. at 5.
310. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 25.
311. Freitas et al., supra note 2, at 1 (describing applicability of influenza plans to coronavirus).
312. Id.
313. Fact Check: COVID-19 and Influenza Vaccines Too Different to Be Directly Compared, REUTERS
(Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-covid-influenza-vaccines/fact-check-covid-19and-influenza-vaccines-too-different-to-be-directly-compared-idUSKBN28I2UE.
314. Id.
315. Ian R. Tizard, Vaccination Against Coronaviruses in Domestic Animals, VACCINE (July 14, 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7284272.
316. See REUTERS, supra note 313.
317. Id.
318. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN L. REV. 577, 578 (1988).

January 2022

THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO COVID-19

93

make federal funds available,319 as well as the application of the National
Defense Production Act that forces private industry to produce necessary
supplies to respond to the pandemic.320 Even where the policy or plan states in
the affirmative that a particular action will happen in response to a given trigger,
there are no enforcement mechanisms. As explained below, these points of
discretionary executive action are susceptible to partisan pressure and outright
politicization.321 The federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic could have
benefitted from the enhanced accountability that would have resulted from
bright-line pandemic policy triggers. These policy triggers or decision points
could be drafted to require either a specific response action or a public statement
as to why the government was choosing not to implement the response. Once
embedded in the policy, these bright-line triggers could help guard against
federal officials who might be vulnerable to partisan pressure or otherwise
swayed by self-interest. The requirement that government officials make public
their rationale for exercising their judgment contrary to the pandemic protocols
would increase transparency and invite public oversight.
B. HOLDING THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE
The federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how even
the best laid pandemic plans will not protect the country from the nonfeasance
or malfeasance of government officials, including the president. As a threshold
matter, it is imperative for Congress to empanel a COVID-19 Commission to
investigate how and why this failure of political will occurred and report its
findings to the American people.322 Pending the results of a congressional
inquiry, it is important to consider structural reform to ensure that government
actions are transparent and government officials remain accountable during a
public health crisis.
When a “severe” or “very severe” pandemic threat looms, a swift sciencedriven government response is essential because lives hang in the balance.323
Accordingly, the traditional sets of checks and balances that restrain executive
action are ill-suited to address the demands of a public health crisis.
Congressional oversight and judicial review both occur after the fact and will
offer too little too late. Public watchdogs who rely on Freedom of Information
319. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206, and scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C. (2002).
Even once declared, the scope of the support and resources made available to the states continues to be
discretionary.
320. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061–2171 (2002). The DPA is the primary
authority to ensure the timely availability of resources for national defense and civil emergency preparedness
and response.
321. One option, also explained below, is to attempt to insulate the CDC and other public health functions
structurally by creating an independent agency.
322. Legislation was introduced in the both the 116th and 117th Congress to empanel a COVID-19
Commission. National Coronavirus Act of 2021, H.R. 1306, 117th Cong. § 4(2)(S)(T) (2021).
323. It is also informed by the severity of the pandemic. See HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 43.
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Act (FOIA) requests to monitor executive activity will be blindsided.324 It is not
sufficient to wait for a future administration to change course because the
correction will necessarily occur after the damage has already been done. The
fact that the Biden administration immediately reversed many of the measures
taken by the Trump administration that compromised our pandemic
preparedness and response does not mean that we are out of the woods.325 The
raging partisan divide over the role and reliability of science cautions against
viewing President Trump as simply a rogue executive. To the contrary, the
growing embrace of anti-science bias that is discussed below in Subpart C
strongly suggests the need for hardwired standards and guidelines that mandate
science-driven decision making when the public health is at stake. Accordingly,
this Subpart identifies three potential areas where legislation can help hold the
government and its officials accountable during a public health crisis: (1)
whistleblower protections to empower individuals;326 (2) transparency and
reporting requirements to keep the public informed; and (3) safeguards to
insulate public health decision making from partisan influence and pressure.
1. Whistleblower Protections
During the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, individual government
officials were often vilified by President Trump for speaking directly to the
public or contradicting the spin that he was putting on the pandemic. As
described above in Part III, Dr. Messonnier of the CDC drew the fury of the
President when she warned the American people on February 25, 2020 to
prepare for a pandemic and a “severe disruption of daily life.”327 As the
pandemic progressed, numerous administration officials would stand silently at
the daily Coronavirus Task Force briefing while the President made dangerous
and unfounded claims, including speculating whether injecting disinfectants
could kill the virus.328 Dr. Deborah Birx, who served as the Coronavirus
Response Coordinator in the Trump administration, was present at the briefing
where President Trump extolled the virtues of disinfectants, but she did nothing
to correct the alarming misinformation spread by the President.329 When asked

324. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 5 U.S.C. § 552, at 5, 18.
325. It is important to note that the Biden administration has already reversed many of the measures taken
by the Trump administration that compromised our pandemic preparedness and response. Mabinty Quarshie,
Biden’s Wild Week of Executive Orders, USATODAY (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2021/01/28/biden-reverses-trump-policies-healthcare-abortion-covid-19/4298282001.
326. The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1206).
327. See Abbott & Armour, supra note 256; see also Erika Edwards, Senior CDC Official Who First Warned
of COVID-19 Pandemic Resigns, NBC NEWS (May 7, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/
senior-cdc-official-who-first-warned-covid-19-pandemic-resigns-n1266680.
328. Meredith McGraw & Sam Stein, It’s Been Exactly One Year Since Trump Suggested Injecting Bleach.
We’ve Never Been the Same., POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/23/
trump-bleach-one-year-484399.
329. Id.
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about her silence, Dr. Birx explained. “I didn’t know how to handle that
episode,” and then added “I still think about it every day.”330
President Trump was known for his threatening and bullying management
style, and he was often publicly quite critical of his subordinates.331 He
specifically attacked whistleblowers and famously unmasked the national
security whistleblower whose report led to President Trump’s first impeachment
inquiry.332 The President’s actions, along with those of some of his supporters
on Capitol Hill, directly undercut the efficacy of the Whistleblower Protection
Act of 1989 that extends certain protections to government employees who
reveal activity that poses, inter alia, a “substantial and specific danger to public
health and safety.”333
The mistreatment of government officials and employees in the Trump
administration underscores the importance of securing robust protections for
federal whistleblowers who expose wrongdoing. For obvious reasons, these
protections are especially crucial in areas such as national security and public
health. The Whistleblower Protection Improvement Act of 2021 (WPIA) is a
bipartisan effort to strengthen protections for federal whistleblowers and address
many of the deficiencies in existing law.334 First and foremost, it clarifies that
no federal official, including the President and Vice President, can interfere with
or retaliate against a whistleblower for sharing information with Congress.335 It
provides whistleblowers with a new legal remedy and expands the scope of the
protections to cover more classes of government employees, including Public
Health Service officers or applicants.336 The WPIA also provides that every
covered federal employee has a right to communicate directly with Congress by
expressly providing the right to petition Congress, furnish information to
Congress, or respond to requests from Congress.337
If enacted, the WPIA would represent the first change in federal
whistleblowing protections since the Whistleblower Enhancement Act of
2012.338 Although the WPIA proposes important safeguards, Congress should
consider additional ways to both incentivize and streamline whistleblowing in

330. Id.
331. Trump Is Bullying His Own People into Silence, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-bullying-his-own-people-into-silence/2018/08/14/
0d66beb4-9ff8-11e8-93e3-24d1703d2a7a_story.html.
332. Brian Stelter, Trump Attacks Whistleblower in Tweetstorm Full of Rants and Conspiracies, CNN (Dec.
28, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/28/politics/trump-ukraine-whistleblower-twitter/index.html.
333. See Whistleblower Protection Act § 2302(b)(8).
334. The Whistleblower Protection Improvement Act of 2021, H.R. 2988, 117th Congress (2021).
335. Id. at Sec. 2(d).
336. Id. at Sec. 3(e).
337. Id. at Sec. 2(b)(1)(E) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) to include “‘the exercise of any right protected
under section 7211’”).
338. The Whistleblower Enhancement Act of 2012, P.L. 112-199, 112th Cong. (2012).
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the context of public health concerns. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act339
enhanced protections for whistleblowers and incentivized whistleblowers to
report information about federal securities laws violations and foreign
corruption to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with a
potential monetary reward.340 A similar form of monetary incentive might be
appropriate given the high potential for loss of life when matters of public health
are involved, but the obvious sticking point would be to identify a source of
funding because the SEC monetary rewards are funded by the penalties imposed
on the wrongdoing.341
With respect to streamlining public health whistleblowing, the WPIA
clarifies the right of covered federal employees to communicate directly with
Congress, a member of Congress or a congressional committee, but it does not
address the more typical way that federal employees report information about
wrongdoing. The Inspector General of a federal agency has the authority to
“receive and investigate complaints or information from an
employee . . . concerning the possible existence of an activity
constituting . . . abuse of authority or a substantial and specific danger to the
public health and safety.”342 An Inspector General is required to
“immediate[ly]” report to the head of the agency any “particularly serious or
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the administration of
programs and operations.”343 The agency head is then required to deliver the
report to the appropriate congressional authorities within seven days.344 Of
course, in the case of a pandemic response or other catastrophic public health
crisis, seven days can make all the difference.
The proposed IG Independence and Empowerment Act of 2021 seeks to
respond to some of the abuses directed at Inspectors General under the Trump
administration.345 It provides enhanced reporting to Congress in certain
instances and would be a good vehicle to streamline Inspector General reports
in the context of public health emergencies. Currently, an Inspector General is
required to take an intermediate step where they first must report to the political
appointee who heads the agency. The agency head then has an additional seven

339. Section 922 of Dodd-Frank authorizes the SEC to pay eligible whistleblowers a percentage of any
monetary recovery. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922,
124 Stat. 1376, 1841(2010).
340. In the ten years since the enactment of Dodd-Frank, whistleblowers have been paid more than $500
million under the Dodd-Frank incentive program. Mary Jane Wilmoth, Dodd-Frank Act: Ten Years Later and
More Than $500 Million Paid to Whistleblowers, NAT’L L. REV. (July 21, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dodd-frank-act-ten-years-later-and-more-500-million-paid-towhistleblowers.
341. Dodd-Frank Act § 922.
342. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (as amended through Pub. L.
No. 114-317 (2016)). Id. at § 5(d) (duty to keep Congress informed).
343. Id. at § 5(d).
344. Id.
345. IG Independence and Empowerment Act, H.R. 2662, 117th Cong. (2021).
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days to notify Congress. Rather than require this intermediate step, Congress
could authorize Inspectors General to report directly to Congress upon receiving
a credible report that federal authorities were not following pandemic policy or
otherwise directly jeopardizing the health and safety of the public.
2. Transparency and Reporting Requirements
The proposed change in the Inspectors General reporting requirements
described above is designed to keep Congress informed of wrongdoing in the
executive branch. However, it is also important to keep the general public
informed during a public health crisis. As noted earlier, the public watchdogs
and the media often use FOIA requests to secure information regarding
executive branch decision making, but FOIA requests are not a viable option
when every moment counts. Accordingly, Congress should take steps to ensure
that the general public has access to up-to-date and current information
throughout the duration of a pandemic or other public health crisis.
In March 2020, as the pandemic was just gathering steam in the United
States, the CDC came under intense criticism when testing data temporarily
disappeared from its website.346 The data disappeared at the same time there was
a raging controversy about whether diagnostic tests were freely available.347 In
July 2020, a similar concern arose when the Trump administration stripped the
CDC of its data collection role and directed hospitals to report COVID-19
statistics to HHS.348 These statistics included the number of confirmed COVID19 cases, as well as the availability of ICU beds, ventilators, and PPE.349 All the
previously collected data temporarily disappeared from the CDC website after
the change was announced, but the information was quickly reposted in the wake
of damning press coverage.350 The change in data collection was roundly
criticized in the press, and the data collection responsibility was eventually
returned to the CDC a little over a month after the shift was announced.351

346. John Bonifield & Elizabeth Cohen, Congressman Calls CDC’s Plan to Report Number of US
Coronavirus Tests ‘Wholly Inadequate,’ CNN (Mar. 4, 2020, 7:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/04/
health/cdc-website-coronavirus-testing/index.html.
347. Id.
348. “Since March, hospitals have reported daily information on the availability of hospital beds, ventilators,
and personal protective equipment to an established data collection network run by CDC called the National
Healthcare Safety Network or NHSN, which has operated for years.” Pien Huang, White House Strips CDC of
Data Collection Role for COVID-19 Hospitalizations, NPR (July 15, 2020, 1:31 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2020/07/15/891351706/white-house-strips-cdc-of-data-collection-role-for-covid-19hospitalizations.
349. Id.
350. Nathaniel Weixel, Trump Administration Restores Some COVID-19 Hospitalization Data to CDC
Website, THE HILL (July 16, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/507696-trump-administration-restoressome-covid-hospitalization-data-to-cdc.
351. Robbie Whelan, COVID-19 Data Will Once Again Be Collected by CDC, in Policy Reversal, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/troubled-covid-19-data-system-returning-to-cdc11597945770.
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These notable missteps undermined public confidence in the CDC and its
ability to manage the pandemic response. Congress could address this lapse by
expanding the public reporting responsibilities of the CDC. For example, the
CDC is currently required by statute to report “national notifiable diseases.”352
Its reports are published and made public each week in the CDC’s Weekly
Mortality and Morbidity Report.353 To the extent that public reporting
requirements already exist, it should be relatively noncontroversial to expand
these requirements to include statistics related to pandemics or other comparable
public health emergencies. In addition to these statistics, the CDC could be
required to report out the pandemic threat level using its various assessment
tools, such as the PRAF.354 Instead of a weekly publication, however, Congress
should mandate a real-time dashboard that would track the progress of the
pandemic and response efforts.355 This legislative mandate would remove the
possibility that the CDC could be sidelined by future administrations or succumb
to partisan pressure to withhold vital public health information from the public.
In terms of communications, the current pandemic plans designate HHS as
the lead agency, and stress that clear and accurate public health messaging is an
essential part of a pandemic response.356 During the COVID-19 pandemic,
however, the Trump administration bypassed both HHS and the CDC in favor
of the Coronavirus White House Task Force that was led by Vice President
Pence.357 President Trump also handled much of the messaging himself,
speaking in ways that contradicted or undermined the recommendations of his
own Task Force.358 If Congress mandates a stronger public reporting role for the
CDC, it could provide a counterweight for another administration bent on
spreading disinformation. By hardwiring communications through a public
reporting requirement, Congress would not be silencing the rest of the
administration, but it would be able to help insulate the CDC and its important
role from partisan influence.

352. National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://wwwn.cdc.gov/nndss (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
353. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
354. See HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6, at 12, 51–52; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
355. In the earliest days of the pandemic, Johns Hopkins University developed a real time dashboard that
reflects worldwide cases and provides data visualization that is designed to increase transparency and help the
public understand of the nature of the pandemic. Doug Donovan, Map Tracks Coronavirus Outbreak in Near
Real Time, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/01/23/coronavirus-outbreakmapping-tool-649-em1-art1-dtd-health.
356. See NIMS, supra note 37, at 48; see also supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text (discussing role of
HHS in ESF-8).
357. Rebecca Ballhaus, Trump Announces Coronavirus Task Force, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2020) (originally
led by the Secretary of HHS, who was later replaced by Vice President Pence).
358. Andrew Solender, Trump May Skip Daily Briefings as Polls Show Low Public Trust in White House
COVID-19 Response, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2020, 10:11 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2020/
04/25/trump-may-skip-daily-briefings-as-polls-show-low-public-trust-in-white-house-covid-19-response/
?sh=b8a25c4231b8.
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3. Accountability and Independence
Whereas the first two Subparts considered ways to empower individuals
and the general public, this Section asks how to demand accountability from
government officials. In the case of a pandemic or other public health
emergency, we cannot afford to demand accountability after the fact because the
potential cost is too high. Instead, the challenge is to put in place safeguards that
will make our government actors accountable in the first instance. The goal
should be to prevent another failed federal response, rather than to hold people
to account after it has occurred.
Given how the Trump administration degraded and politicized the role of
the CDC during his tenure in office,359 it would be prudent to consider
legislation and other steps that could insulate the CDC from future
administrations that might try to subvert its mission for partisan advantage.
Currently housed under HHS, CDC directors serve at the pleasure of the
President and do not require Senate approval.360 In order to restore the authority
of the CDC and importance of science-driven decision making, Congress should
consider reconstituting the CDC as an independent agency.361 A 2020 article in
the JAMA Health Forum makes the case that such a move is not only necessary
to restore public trust in the CDC public health policy decisions, but also to allow
the CDC to make those policy decisions in the first place.362
Congress has a number of models to draw on for designing an independent
agency structure for the CDC. The Federal Reserve Board is probably the bestknown independent federal agency.363 More recently, we saw the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) under the Dodd-Frank Act in the
wake of the Great Recession.364 There is also precedent for moving functions
out of an existing agency to form an independent entity. In 1994, the Social
Security Administration was moved out of HHS and reconfigured as an
359. Christopher Sellers, Leif Fredrickson, Alissa Cordner, Kelsey Breseman, Eric Nost & Kelly Wilkins,
Coronavirus and the Three-Year Trump Quest to Slash Science at the CDC, EDGI (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://envirodatagov.org/an-embattled-landscape-series-part-2a-coronavirus-and-the-three-year-trump-questto-slash-science-at-the-cdc.
360. Ed Yong, Trump’s Pick for CDC Director is Experienced but Controversial, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 22,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/03/trumps-pick-for-cdc-director-is-experienced-butcontroversial/556202.
361. A similar argument could be made on behalf of the FDA. Garret Jones, COVID-19 Failures Show Why
the CDC and FDA Should Be More Independent, DISCOURSE (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.discoursemagazine.com/politics/2020/04/16/covid-19-failures-show-why-the-cdc-and-fda-shouldbe-more-independent.
362. Soleil Shah & Howard Forman, The Case for Independent Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention—Protecting Public Health from Politics, J. AM. MED. ASS’N: HEALTH F. (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-health-forum/fullarticle/2771202.
363. Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, The CDC Needs to Be Independent Like the Federal Reserve, GLOBE POST
(Aug. 4, 2020), https://theglobepost.com/2020/08/03/cdc-independent (describing the virtues of an independent
Federal Reserve).
364. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1011; see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183
(2020) (striking restrictions on removal of single director of CFPB on separation of powers grounds but
preserving agency structure).
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independent federal agency.365 The new agency could be further insulated from
partisan influence by its governance structure. For example, the Director could
be appointed by the President with Senate approval and serve for a term that
extended beyond a single administration. A diverse governing board whose
members have staggered terms would add another layer of independence.
Ideally, the agency would be able to advance public health policy unhampered
by the partisan pressures of any particular administration, just as the Federal
Reserve Board is supposed to act in the best interest of the American public
without regard to politics.366 It would also be important to secure dedicated
funding for the new agency to further enhance the CDC’s autonomy, similar to
the dedicated funding stream enjoyed by the CFPB.
In terms of the jurisdiction of the new agency, it could be given broad
powers during a public health emergency. As the independent science-driven
agency, it could assume some of the discretionary public health powers currently
exercised by the President, such as the power to invoke the Defense Production
Act, mobilize the medical reserve corps, and deploy federal medical stations.367
It could also oversee the development of medical countermeasures, the
production of diagnostic testing, and the management of the Strategic National
Stockpile. It could serve as the scientific liaison to other government agencies,
providing expert and independent scientific guidance. It could also be the
primary source of government messaging regarding public health issues.
Although the creation of an independent public health agency with
dedicated funding may not be politically attainable, at least at the present time,
there are other ways that Congress can move to insulate pandemic policy from
partisan influence. For example, President Biden reinstated the White House
National Security Council Directorate for Global Health Security and
Biodefense that had been disbanded under the Trump administration.368 As
noted earlier, however, these sorts of after-the-fact corrections by a subsequent
administration are not a sufficient failsafe during a public health emergency
when time is of the essence. Accordingly, Congress could amend the National
Security Act of 1947 to mandate the creation of the Directorate for Global Health
Security and Biodefense. 369 It could also mandate the return of the responsibility
for the Strategic National Stockpile to the CDC, regardless of whether it was an
independent agency. In the same legislation, it could also restructure the Office
365. Shah & Forman, supra note 362.
366. Batabyal, supra note 363.
367. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2061–71 (2002).
368. National Security Memorandum on United States Global Leadership to Strengthen the International
COVID-19 Response and to Advance Global Health Security and Biological Preparedness (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/21/national-security-directive-unitedstates-global-leadership-to-strengthen-the-international-covid-19-response-and-to-advance-global-healthsecurity-and-biological-preparedness; see also Deb Riechman, Trump Disbanded NSC Pandemic Unit That
Experts Had Praised, AP NEWS (Mar. 14, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-ap-top-news-virusoutbreak-barack-obama-public-health-ce014d94b64e98b7203b873e56f80e9a.
369. Kessler & Kelly, supra note 297.
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of Assistant Secretary of Response and Preparedness in HHS that was created in
2006 under the original Bush-era pandemic legislation.370
C. CONFRONTING PARTISAN SCIENCE DENIAL
Pandemic preparedness and response are highly dependent on scientific
projections and expertise.371 There is a current strain in American politics that is
at odds with accepted scientific views, as exemplified by the opposition to
climate change initiatives.372 Opinion polls show that science skepticism and
outright denial may be minority views in the United States, but not within the
Republican party.373 Within the Republican party, there is also strong support
for individual liberty and economic freedoms, which can be at odds with certain
social distancing measures.374 As a result, Republican control of Congress or the
White House could amplify a minoritarian bias that is both distrustful of science
and highly protective of individual liberty and economic freedoms.375 In the case
of the COVID-19 pandemic, the confluence of these two beliefs undermined and
sometimes actively thwarted the pandemic response at all levels of government
as Republican administrations were less likely to wage a full-throttle response
to a pandemic threat based on scientific modeling of an “invisible enemy.”376
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, the initial threat warnings were
viewed through a partisan lens that labeled the novel coronavirus a “hoax” and
just another attempt on the part of the Democrats to derail the Trump
presidency.377 As the stock market reached new heights in February 2020,
administration officials continued to dismiss and downplay the threat of the
novel virus even after the CDC confirmed the first human-to-human
transmission and then community spread later in the month.378 Many
Republican governors adopted a similar stance.379 Whistleblower reports have
370. Swaine et al., supra note 98.
371. See generally HHS 2017 UPDATE, supra note 6.
372. Brian Kennedy & Cary Funk, Democrats and Republicans Differ over Role and Value of Scientists in
Policy Debates, PEW RSCH. (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/09/democrats-andrepublicans-role-scientists-policy-debates.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Jeanine Santucci, Partisan Divide over Social Distancing Narrows as States Ramp up Coronavirus
Measures, Poll Finds, USATODAY (Apr. 2, 2020, 1:23 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2020/04/02/coronavirus-social-distancing-gap-between-democrats-gop-narrows/5109621002.
376. Ronald Brownstein, Red and Blue America Aren’t Experiencing the Same Pandemic, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/03/how-republicans-and-democrats-thinkabout-coronavirus/608395.
377. Bryan Sullivan, Fox News Faces Lawsuit for Calling COVID-19 a ‘Hoax,’ FORBES (Apr. 10, 2020,
7:32 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2020/04/10/covid-19-lawsuit-against-fox-news/
?sh=7c5729ab5739.
378. Greg Miller & Ellen Nakashima, President’s Intelligence Briefing Book Repeatedly Cited Virus Threat,
WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/presidents-intelligencebriefing-book-repeatedly-cited-virus-threat/2020/04/27/ca66949a-8885-11ea-ac8a-fe9b8088e101_story.html.
379. Cleve R. Wootson Jr. & Tim Craig, Southern Governors Who Initially Downplayed Coronavirus
Threat Ease into Reopening of Their States, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/

102

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:1

since come to light that allege officials in the Trump White House knowingly
turned their back on science in favor of cronyism and a myopic focus on the
economy.380 President Trump himself said in interviews with journalist Bob
Woodward that he intentionally misrepresented the extent of the threat to the
American people.381
For legislators and policymakers, the pressing question is how to prevent
this minoritarian anti-science bias from derailing future preparedness and
response efforts. Our national preparedness and response plans all stress the
importance of clear, consistent, and accurate communications with government
and private sector partners, as well as with the general public.382 For example,
CDC guidance on the use of NPIs explains at great length how crucial it is to
have community buy-in regarding the use of NPIs.383 The same can be said
regarding the efficacy and safety of vaccines.384 However, the messaging from
the Trump administration could not have been farther off the mark, especially in
the crucial early days of the pandemic. President Trump made outlandish
comments and projections, often via Twitter.385 He also attacked members of
his own administration.386 As noted in the prior Subpart B.2, it may be possible
to statutorily mandate communication channels, especially if the CDC were
reconstituted as an independent agency that is not managed by the Executive
Office of the President. Of course, it would be impossible to muzzle a sitting
President, and communications protocols are not typically handled in statutes—
but then these are not typical times.
CONCLUSION
Our national pandemic preparedness and response planning is predicated
on a cross-institutional, coordinated effort that involves federal, state, local, and
private actors, but it assumes that the federal government will play a pivotal role.
This coordinated effort is organized around the common goals of the
containment, mitigation, and eventual end of a pandemic outbreak. In the case
of the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government failed to step into its
assigned role. Instead, it waged an aggressive disinformation campaign, bullied
states and localities, and mocked the advice of its own infectious disease experts.
The result was a chaotic and uneven state-driven pandemic response that varied
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greatly from state to state, resulting in a patchwork of divergent and conflicting
orders and guidelines.
Policy makers and scholars will spend many years debating what caused
this massive government failure, how many lives it cost, and what could have
been done to prevent it. Hopefully, congressional hearings and FOIA requests
will fill in many of the missing details as to how our federal response to the
COVID-19 pandemic went off the rails and ultimately failed the American
public. In the face of all the misinformation disseminated by the Trump
administration, it is imperative that these inquiries be made with the
understanding that the federal government had fair warning of the pandemic
threat. It was not a “black swan,” as Trump administration officials so often
claimed. These inquiries must also be made with the understanding that it is not
possible to actually judge the efficacy of our pandemic preparedness and
response policy because the federal government failed to follow its own
guidance. When faced with a novel virus that was both easily transmissible and
clinically severe, the federal government chose to obfuscate rather than to act.
This is a dangerous and troubling precedent that must be addressed.
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